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Abstract 
Since 2012 Syria has arguably taken over the position previously held by Iraq as the focal 
point for the broader jihadist movement.
1
 The conflict has witnessed the rise of a new al-
Qaʿida affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, the entrance of an existing affiliate into the country, the 
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), and the emergence of non-al-Qaʿida-affiliated 
Salafi-Jihadi groups of which Ahrar al-Sham is a prominent example. However the growing 
presence of Salafi-Jihadi groups in Syria has not manifested itself as a unified or homogenous 
movement. Rather the self-proclaimed Salafi-Jihadi groups have largely been unable to 
efficiently unify their efforts or ranks despite the creation of numerous coalitions. ISIS was 
rebuked by the al-Qaʿida leadership and has engaged in military and ideological rivalry with 
Jabhat al-Nusra. Arguably at stake is the title of the inheritor and guardian of the legacy of 
Usama bin Ladin. This study outlines the larger underlining ideological differences for this 
rivalry as extracted, from the groups’ ample bibliography within the timeframe of January 
2012 and May 2014, and subsequently structured and analysed.  
By comparing the ideological characteristics of the official al-Qaʿida affiliate (Jabhat 
al-Nusra) with groups of similar outlook, the thesis might further shed light on what an 
affiliation with the group entails in a post-Arab Spring era. Similarly, the comparative 
analysis of Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS up until 2014 arguably illustrates two diverging trends 
within the Salafi-Jihadi movement transcending the Syrian conflict.  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
1
 Thomas Hegghammer, “Jihadism: Seven Assumptions Shaken by the Arab Spring”, Memo from the 
conference “Rethinking Islamist Politics”, published by Project on Middle East Political Science, 3 February 
2014, http://pomeps.org/2014/02/03/jihadism-seven-assumptions-shaken-by-the-arab-spring/. 
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Preface 
I started doing research on Salafi-Jihadi groups in the Syrian civil war mid-June 2013 
working as a summer student at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) where 
my main focus was three Salafi-Jihadi groups, Jabhat al-Nusra, The Islamic State of Iraq and 
al-Sham and Ahrar al-Sham. Whereas the first two were al-Qaʿida affiliates had recently 
fallen out with each other, the third had publically distanced themselves from al-Qaʿida whilst 
acknowledging their ideological kinship with the organization. Initially, their ideological 
similarities appeared more striking to me than their differences, whilst apparently not 
sufficient for them to merger or even collaborate more extensively. By the end of my 
internship at FFI in August 2013, I had mapped the statements and operations of these three 
groups and gained an impression of their role and position within the larger landscape of 
armed groups. That said, the relations between them; whether they were ideological triplets, 
enemies, “frenemies” or genuine “mujahid brothers” remained somewhat unclear to me. 
Similarly blurry was the role of al-Qaʿida’s in it all; whether it was a mere label, a puppet 
master pulling the strings or a retired grumpy grandfather bypassed by those younger. 
Intrigued by the subject, and encouraged by my colleagues at FFI, I decided to investigate the 
ideological similarities and the differences between these three groups further in my 
upcoming master. With a year at my disposal I optimistically set a side autumn to gather more 
empirical evidence, and winter and spring to write the thesis.  
By summer 2014, the situation in Syria and the role of the three protagonists of my thesis, 
had changed drastically from the previous year. A parallel intra-rebel largely directed against 
ISIS had emerged six months earlier and was still ongoing. ISIS had further been disowned by 
the leadership of al-Qaʿida in February just to be reborn four months later as the Islamic State 
(IS) – a self-designated caliphate. Its rapid expansion geographically in both Iraq and Syria, 
pared with its self-propagation of mass executions gained the group an unprecedented 
worldwide reputation for ruthlessness and brutality. Jabhat al-Nusra for their part wore their 
position as the sole affiliate for al-Qaʿida’s in Syria seemingly as a badge of honour, whilst at 
the same time paradoxically engaging in this parallel war against ISIS/IS. Ahrar al-Sham was 
at the forefront in the armed and rhetoric war against ISIS alongside Jabhat al-Nusra, however 
its demand of an Islamic state had seemingly sunk on their list of their publically pronounced 
priorities.  
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As one might suspect, my original, stringent plan to analyse the group’s publications up 
until January 2014 was rapidly surpassed by what I considered to be the necessity of tracking 
the unravelling intra-rebel conflict and the ideological shifts and variances it either provoked 
or simply highlighted. And, as my topic of study gained an actuality I did not foresee, the 
worry of writing something already undated when sent to print kept stretching the time-frame 
of my analysis.  
With FFI and the University of Oslo granting me a much desired extension, I was able to 
combine the finalizing of this thesis whilst working at the Norwegian Embassy of Damascus 
based in Beirut. Working with the conflict in a different format at the embassy confirmed my 
initial impression that there is a great interest and demand for in-depth knowledge about the 
ideological roots, innovations and variations of the Salafi-Jihadi flank of the Syria civil war 
beyond its simplistic portrayal in the media and transcending my humble efforts. 
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Glossary of Acronyms and Abbreviations 
AS Katā’ib Aḥrār al-Shām   The Freemen Battalions of al-Sham (alt. The Free People of al-Sham Battalions)  
(Referred to as Ahrar al-Sham) 
 
AQ al-Qāʿida or Qāʿidat al-Jihād or  al-Qaʿida 
 Tanẓīm al-Qāʿida 
 
FSA al-Jaysh al-Sūriyy al-Ḥurr   Free Syrian Army 
 
IF al-Jabha al-Isāmiyya    Islamic Front 
 
ISI al-Dawla al-Islāmiyya fi-l-ʿIrāq  Islamic State of Iraq 
 
ISIS al-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi-l-ʿIrāq wa-l-Shām Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham 
 
JN Jabhat al-Nuṣra li ahl al-Shām min  The Support Front for the People of Greater al-Sham from the Fighters of al-Sham in 
Mujāhidī al-Shām fī Ṣāḥat al-Jihād  The Field of Jihad (Referred to as Jabhat al-Nusra) 
 
NC al-Iʾtilāf al-Waṭaniyy li-Quwā   Syrian National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces   
al-Thawra wa-l-Muʿāraḍa al-Sūriyya   (Referred to as the National Coalition) 
       
NCB    Hayʾat al-Tansīq al-Waṭaniyya li-Quwā  The National Coordination Body for Democratic Change  
al-Taghyīr al-Dīmuqrmuqrāṭiyy 
 
PYD Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat    Kurdish Democratic Union Party  
 
PKK Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê  Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
 
SMC al-Majlis al-ʿAskariyy al-ʾAʿlā  Supreme Military Council 
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SNC al-Majlis al-Waṭaniyy al-Sūriyy   Syrian National Council   
 
SIF al-Jabha al-Islāmiyya al-Sūriyya  Syrian Islamic Front 
 
SIG al-Ḥukūma al-ʾIntiqāliyya al-Sūriyya  Syrian Interim Government  
 
SILF Jabhat Taḥrīr Sūrīya al-Islāmiyya  Syrian Islamic Liberation Front 
 
SRF Jabhat Thuwwār Sūriyā   Syria’s Revolutionaries Front     
 
YPG Yekîneyên Parastina Gel    People’s Defence Units  
 
A note on transliteration and translation 
For transliteration I have followed the transliteration chart and guidelines used by the 
International Journal of Middle East Studies.
3
 In accordance with these guidelines, I use 
diacritical marks and italics when Arabic words or citations are left untranslated. I have left 
some words of Arabic origin untransliterted (with the exception of the Arabic letters ʿayn (ʿ) 
and hamza (ʾ) (not initial hamza)) in correspondence with the wordlist compiled by the 
Journal of Middle East Studies over words which have entered the English language.
4
  
Personal names, geographical locations and names of groups, parties and organizations, will 
not be italicized or written with diacritical marks, with the exception of the Arabic letters ʿayn 
(ʿ) and hamza (ʾ) (not initial hamza) with the exception of place names which have acquired a 
standardized English spelling.
5
 Further I have chosen to transliterate place names according to 
their pronunciation in classical Arabic/Modern Standard Arabic (alt. fuṣḥā) as opposed to 
colloquial Arabic, English or French for the purpose of consistency in spelling. As such al-
Ladhiqiya will be spelled as such as opposed to Latakia, Latakiyah or Lattaquié, and similar 
Dayr al-Zur will be chosen over Deir Ezzur, Deir ez-Zur, Der Ezzor, Der Zor etc. As for the 
names of the armed factions, groups, parties and organizations I refer to in this analysis, I will 
write their full names in Arabic transliteration (following the above mentioned norm) as well 
as a full English translation first time mentioned. Thereafter I will pragmatically refer to some 
in English whilst other in Arabic transliteration, following the general standard of the foreign 
press as well as scholarly literature. For instance, Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham will 
appear as such, whereas al-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi-l-ʿIraq wa-l-Sham will be referred to in its 
English translation as The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. A full list of all groups referred 
to with full Arabic transliteration, translation and abbreviations is found in the preceding 
section entitled Abbreviations. 
I will further transliterate Arabic in pausal mode without case endings, with the exception of 
iḍāfa constructions where tāʾ marbūṭa (feminine ending) is transliterated as at (as opposed to 
regular a). Hamzat al-waṣl is omitted. I the case of words with an initial shams letter (alt. sun 
letter) preceding the definite article, I will not assimilate the preceding letter lām, for instance 
                                                 
3
 “IJMES Translation & Transliteration Guide,” Internation Journal of Middle East Studies, 
http://ijmes.chass.ncsu.edu/IJMES_Translation_and_Transliteration_Guide.htm.  
4
 “IJME World List”, Internation Journal of Middle East Studies, 5 October 2010, 
http://ijmes.chass.ncsu.edu/docs/WordList.pdf.  
5
 Place names which appear in Mariam-Webster dictionary, such as Damascus and Aleppo, will be written as 
such.  
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al-daʿwa (lit. call, commonly denotes proselytizing and preaching) will be transliterated as 
such as opposed to ad- daʿwa. As Arabic does not distinguish between small and capital 
letters, titles and names will be capitalized according to the norms in English.  
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A note on citation 
A large number of the primary sources this study builds upon were originally published on 
password restricted online forums and social media profiles. Due to online censorship and the 
nature of the content published, a substantial number of the primary sources are no longer 
available on their original web-pages. The official publications of Jabhat al-Nusra and the 
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, their original posts on these forums and social media 
profiles have to a large been collected and re-published by scholar Aaron Y. Zelin on the blog 
Jihadology.net. To facilitate the verification and secure consultation of my sources for the 
reader I have largely cited these sources in their re-published version on Zelin’s blog. As for 
material published via social media profiles or currently closed web-pages I have cited their 
original location and date of publishment. To be sure, all cited documents, audio messages 
and film clips are stored electronically by the author.  
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1 Introduction 
Since 2012 Syria has arguably taken over the position previously held by Iraq as the focal 
point for the broader jihadist movement.
6
 The conflict witnessed the rise of a new al-Qaʿida 
affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, as well as the entrance of an existing affiliate into the country, 
namely the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. Secondly, the rhetoric and ideology commonly 
associated with al-Qaʿida has seemingly been adopted by a larger number of self-identified 
Salafi-Jihadi insurgency groups. And thirdly, the Syrian civil war has become a recurrent 
point of reference in the broader jihadi discourse through publications by ideologues, 
organizations, armed groups and online supporters.   
However the growing presence of Salafi-Jihadi groups in Syria has not manifested 
itself as a unified or homogenous movement. Rather the self-proclaimed Salafi-Jihadi groups 
have largely been unable to efficiently unify their efforts or ranks despite the creation of 
numerous coalitions. As for the relations between two al-Qaʿida affiliates, it has gradually 
deteriorated from rivalry into open warfare. By January 2014 intra-rebel rivalries had 
escalated into a parallel intra-rebel war, with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham on side and 
a broad spectrum of armed oppositional groups on the other, Jabhat al-Nusra included. In 
February the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham was rebuked by the overall al-Qaʿida leader, 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, making Jabhat al-Nusra its sole official affiliate in the country. The 
rebuke from al-Qaʿida and continuous rebel infighting notwithstanding, the Islamic State of 
Iraq and al-Sham has not only remained a force to be reckoned with in the Syrian conflict but 
has resurged in Iraq increasing its territorial control substantially. By 29
 
June 2014 the group 
crowned its military and territorial come-back with a declaration of an Islamic caliphate 
claiming the title of Caliph for its leader.  
As for the broader Salafi-Jihadi movement, the fall-out between the Salafi-jihadi 
factions in Syria has arguably reflected and potentially even created sharp divides within the 
broader movement. Thus, on the one hand the Syrian conflict has indisputably been coloured 
by the ideological influence of al-Qaʿida as the symbols, rhetoric and elements of the ideology 
commonly associated with the group have been adopted by a large number of Syrian 
insurgency groups. On the other hand the spread of Salafi-Jihadism in the conflict has not 
manifested itself as a unified force. Rather the collective of self-proclaimed Salafi-Jihadi has 
                                                 
6
 Thomas Hegghammer, “Jihadism: Seven Assumptions Shaken by the Arab Spring”, Memo from the 
conference “Rethinking Islamist Politics”, published by Project on Middle East Political Science, 3 February 
2014, http://pomeps.org/2014/02/03/jihadism-seven-assumptions-shaken-by-the-arab-spring/. 
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been characterized by factionalism, tension and rebel infighting. As such the Syrian civil war 
has become the scene for a Salafi-Jihadi awakening, as well as “full blown jihadi civil war”. 7  
Thus study attempts to go beyond the ideological and operational similarities assumed 
by the shared label of Salafi-Jihadi as well as an affiliation with al-Qaʿida to explore the 
differences and fault lines within the Syrian Salafi-Jihadi scene. I have chosen three groups I 
consider to be representative of this scene, and whose publications constitute the primary 
empirical base for the analysis. These three groups are Jabhat al-Nusra (official al-Qaʿida 
affiliate), the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (former al-Qaʿida affiliate), and Harakat Ahrar 
al-Sham al-Islamiyya (self-identified Salafi group). The time-frame of this study is from the 
establishment of Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham in January 2012 up untill May 2014.  
The overarching question this analysis aims to answer is “what are the ideological 
differences between Jabhat al-Nusra, ISIS and Ahrar al-Sham?” In addition to a review of 
how the groups themselves have conceptualized their differences, I will apply five parameters 
in the subsequent analysis which arguably reflects key divisive issues within the Salafi-Jihadi 
movement to further identify similarities and diverging stands and priorities amongst the 
three.   
By comparing the ideological characteristics of the official al-Qaʿida affiliate (Jabhat 
al-Nusra) with groups of similar outlook, the thesis might further shed light on what an 
affiliation with the group entails in a post-Arab Spring era. Similarly, the comparative 
analysis of Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS up until 2014 arguably illustrates two diverging trends 
within the Salafi-Jihadi movement transcending the Syrian conflict.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Expression from Aron Lund, “One Year of Jihadi Civil War”, Syria in Crisis (Blog) Carnegie, 9 April 2014, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=55297.  
 3 
 
2 Methodological overview and ethical 
considerations 
2.1 Conceptual and methodological framework 
2.1.1 Salafism 
The three groups analysed here have received a large number of labels denoting their 
ideological and religious foundations as well as their actions. Ahrar al-Sham has been 
categorized as a “Syrian rebel brigade,”8 “Islamist rebel group,”9 “Islamist Brigade,”10 “Salafi 
armed group,”11 a “hardline Salafi group,”12 “anti-Assad jihadist group,”13 “independent 
jihadist,”14 and “salafi jihadist unit.”15 Jabhat al-Nusra as variably been described as a “Syrian 
salafist group,”16 “Syria’s indigenous jihadist organization,”17 “Syria’s homegrown Salafi-
jihadist group” 18 “Salafi armed group,”19 “salafi jihadist unit,”20 “radical salafi-jihadi 
group,”21 and, since its links with al-Qaʿida was affirmed, it has perhaps most frequently been 
referred to simply as “al-Qaʿida’s affiliate in Syria.” Finally, ISIS “jihadis”22  
                                                 
8
 Lina Khatib, “The Nusra Front’s Game-Changing Rise in Syria”, Carnegie, 24 March 2015, http://carnegie-
mec.org/2015/03/24/nusra-front-s-game-changing-rise-in-syria. 
9
 Aron Lund, “Islamist Merger in Syria: Ahrar al-Sham Swallows Suqour al-Sham”, Syria in Crisis  (Blog) 
Carnegie Endowment, 23 March 2015, http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=59471.  
10
 Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, (New York: Regan Arts, 2015), ix 
11
 “Tentative Jihad: Syria’s Fundamentalist Opposition”. Middle East Report. No. 131. International Crisis 
Group. 12 October 2012. 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Syri
a/131-tentative-jihad-syrias-fundamentalist-opposition.pdf.  
12
 Aron Lund, “Say Hello to the Islamic Front”, Syria in Crisis (Blog) Carnegie, 22 November 2013, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=53679. 
13
 Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror, (London: William Collins, 2015) ix. 
14
 Ibid.,153. 
15
 Michael Weiss, "America's Catch-Up Policy on Syria", NOW Lebanon, 7 March 2013, 
https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/americas-catch-up-policy-on-syria.  
16
 Hanin Ghaddar, “The imminent Hezbollah-Nusra war”, Now Lebanon, 15 May 2013, 
https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/the-imminent-hezbollah-nusra-war.  
17
 Elizabeth O’Bagy, “Jihad in Syria,” Middle East Security Report, No. 6, September 2012, 
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Jihad-In-Syria-17SEPT.pdf, 18. 
18
 Ibid., 10. 
19
 “Tentative Jihad: Syria’s Fundamentalist Opposition”, 9.  
20
 Weiss, "America's Catch-Up Policy on Syria".  
21
 Aron Lund, “Syria’s Salafi Insurgents: The Rise of the Syrian Islamic Front,” UI Occasional Papers, No. 17, 
March 2013, http://www.ui.se/eng/upl/files/86861.pdf,  30. 
22
 “The slow backlash: Sunni religious authorities turn against Islamic State,” The Economist, 6 September 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21615634-sunni-religious-authorities-turn-against-
islamic-state-slow-backlash.  
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Whilst different assessments of the groups ideology certainly adds to the range, the 
large number of labels is more than anything symptomatic of the lack of a universally agreed 
upon terminology or categorizing framework for the classification of Islamic movements.  
Not only are there multiple attempts, by observers, scholars and members of Islamic 
movements themselves
23
 but as Islamic movements arguably “moves” and evolves, the 
existing terminology is constantly the subject of reevaluation and re-definition.  
As any precise categorization of a group, regardless of chosen terminology and 
classifying framework, presupposes an in-depth knowledge of the group’s ideological (and 
arguably theological) basis and operational activities, it is a task performed with greatest 
accuracy in the concluding chapter when such an in-depth analysis has been executed and 
presented. However the in-depth analysis itself presupposes a familiarity with the central 
tenants and characteristics of the broader ideological and political current or discourse to 
which the groups under scrutiny arguably pertains. In other words, the analysis of a group’s 
ideology is of little use unless the broader ideological current it arguably inhabits, challenges, 
influences, and draws its major tenants from is accounted for.  
I have thus pragmatically chosen to adopt the less specific term of Salafi-Jihadi as 
conceptualized by Quintan Wiktorowicz to distinguish the groups from a broader spectrum of 
rebel groups in the uprising. “Salafi” or Salafism denotes the ideal of purifying the Islamic 
creed and the practice of religion, through a literalist interpretation of the religious scripts
24
 
and a strict adherence to the example of the first three generations of Muslims, or al-ṣalaf al-
ṣāliḥ or the “righteous predecessors” (alt. “pious forefathers”). “Jihadi” denotes the 
endorsement of violence and armed activities conceptualized as jihad to replace the perceived 
un-Islamic leadership and power structures with the establishment of an Islamic states
25
 - as 
opposed to non-violent, apolitical quietists purists
  
and politicos engaged in party politics and 
elections.  
To be sure, there are obvious and frequently criticized weaknesses and limitations of 
Wiktorowicz classifying framework, such as being too schematic, negligent of doctrinal and 
                                                 
23
 For a good overview over such categorizing labels and frameworks as well as an assessment of their 
problematic nature and inherent weaknesses, see; Thomas Hegghammer, “Jihadi-Salafis or Revolutionaries? On 
Religion and Politics in the Study of Militant Islamism”, in Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement, 
Roel Meijer (ed.) (London: Hurst & Company, 2009). 
24
 For some Salafis this entails a rejection of the four canonical schools of Islamic jurisdiction in Sunni Islam, 
and instead a sole dependency on ijtihād (independent reasoning) in legal matters. Other adherents of Salafism 
(such as the “branch” of Wahhabism ) follow the Hanbali School of Islamic jurisdiction. Bernard Haykel, «On 
the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action», in Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement, Roel Meijer 
(ed.) (London: Hurst & Company, 2009), 42.  
25
 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 29, Issue 3, 
2006, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10576100500497004?journalCode=uter20#.U2lYe_l_trU. 
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theological differences within Salafism, omitting additional aspects such as sectarianism, and 
mixing means and objectives
26
 and inadequacy in illustrating the inner divergences and 
debates within the three categories.
27
 Whilst some have compensated for this weakness by 
adding sub-branches to his trisection, others have skilfully produced alternative frameworks 
for classification altogether, such as Thomas Hegghammer’s “Preference Based Typology”.28  
In this particular study however, I consider the vagueness of the Salafi-Jihadi category to be 
an advantage considering that the three groups under scrutiny all fit its criteria thus allowing 
me to analyse the three groups without presupposing ideological similarities or differences.  
2.1.2 Ideology and parameters as indicators of ideological distinctions 
Addressing the three groups’ ideology presupposes that they have one, which, depending on 
our definition and translation of ideology, the three groups themselves might dispute. Whilst 
they primarily use the loanword aydiyūlūjiyya (alternatively īdiyūlūjiyyā) to denote man-
made, foreign and particular Western ideologies or political institutions which they ardently 
oppose, they commonly conceptualize the underlying basis for their own beliefs and actions 
with the two concepts of ʿaqīda and manhaj. In Salafi/Salafi-Jihadi discourse the two 
concepts are used complimentary to describe the “creed” and the “practice” of the Righteous 
Predecessors, with the normative assertion of the “right” or “correct” Islamic creed practice.29 
Now turning the table and asking whether or not ʿaqīda and manhaj constitutes an ideology or 
a religious belief, and whether the two are complementary or opposed to each other – depends 
on our chosen definition of ideology out of the ample selection of possible ones.   
As illustrated by John Gerring’s review of definitions of ideology most embody the 
aspects of self-definition, creed and practice
30
 - three elements the three groups agree upon in 
theory as fellow “followers of the Righteous Predecessors” and seemingly sharing ʿaqīda and 
                                                 
26
 Hegghammer, “Jihadi-Salafis or Revolutionaries? On Religion and Politics in the Study of Militant Islamism”.  
27
 Brynjar Lia, “Chapter 5: Jihadi Strategies and Doctrinarians”, in Self-Inflicted Wounds: Debates and Divisions 
within al-Qaʾida and its Periphery, (ed. Assaf Moghadam, Brian Fishman), Harmony Project/CTC, 103. 
28
 As for applying the preference based typology of Islamist Activism by Hegghammer, I have found it 
problematic in this particular case. The premise for using this typology is the ability to pin-point the group’s 
immediate priorities.
 
I have found this difficult in this study where the group’s actions and chosen enemies has 
arguably changed within the timeframe of this analysis – not least with the eruption of a parallel intra-jihadi war. 
However the key divisive factors at the basis of Hegghammer’s typology will be included as parameters in the 
main analysis. Hegghammer, “Jihadi-Salafis or Revolutionaries? On Religion and Politics in the Study of 
Militant Islamism”. 
29
 Whilst the concepts of ʿaqīda embodies the meanings of “doctrine”, “faith”, “conviction” and “creed” manhaj 
(alternatively minhaj) can be translated as “a well-trodden path or trail”, “procedure”, “method”, “practice” or 
“methodology”. 
30
 John Gerring, «Ideology: A Definitional Analysis», Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 50, No. 4, 1997, 
www.jstor.org/stable/448995. 
 6 
 
manhaj. To identify and address where and how these stands shared in theory are manifested 
themselves differently by the three groups I have selected five parameters reflecting some of 
the major disagreements and divergences within what is here referred to as the Salafi-Jihadi-
movement. These five parameters or sub questions forms the basis for the analysis’ five 
empirical chapters; 
- What is the extent to which they conceptualize their differences and does it include 
takfīr (excommunication)? (Chapter 4) 
- What is the centrality of (armed) jihad in their discourse? (Chapter 5) 
- What are the conditions and prerequisites for the establishment of an Islamic State? 
(Chapter 6) 
- What and whom constitute the groups’ hierarchy of enemies and target selection? 
(Chapter 7) 
- How do the groups prioritize between tterritorial and creedal unity vs. geographical 
aims? (Chapter 8) 
Building on the argumentation above, I consider the groups’ stands regarding these 
parameters to be key components and distinguishers of their ideology, whilst acknowledging 
that the full breadth of what can be considered to be their ideology falls outside the scope of 
this analysis. For the sake of simplicity I will further reserve the use of the concept of 
ideology to denote group-specific ideology throughout the analysis whilst noting that this 
separation is purely analytical, and the ideological kinship between them will be emphasized 
and the validity of its distinction discussed in the conclusion.  
2.1.3 A qualitative and quantitative analysis  
The empirical material to which the chosen parameters will be subjected is the groups’ own 
publications thus limiting my focus to the self-projection of the group’s ideology and their 
discursive practice. The empirical material which has been gathered through a long-term open 
source data collection consist of official statements from the groups, speeches of and 
interviews with their central leadership, film-clips from smaller affiliated battalions, as well as 
joint statements with other groups.  
The analysis is primarily qualitative in so forth as it is primarily an in-depth study of 
the content of key official publications, such as speeches, promotional videos and interviews. 
The study is arguably also qualitative in so forth as I track the frequency and continuity of 
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certain stands and themes to identify possible changes over time and distinguish core 
narratives.  
2.2 Limitations 
One of the greatest challenges of this study has been the nature of the Syrian conflict itself. 
Making a clear overview of organizational structure, the geographical span and the size of the 
insurgency groups is not only problematic due to the scarcity of verifiable sources, but further 
precluded by the frequent shifts in alliances, changing patterns of cooperation, the 
establishment of larger joint fronts and the dissolution of others. Furthermore, the insurgency 
groups partaking in the conflict have published, and continue to publish vast amounts of 
textual material, audio tapes and numerous videos online. Because of the complexity of the 
conflict, the immense size of potential sources and texts, as well as my own timely limitations 
I have had to narrow the scope of the study both in terms of time, geographical span and the 
selection of groups. In the following section I will explain and justify these choices, review 
some of the problematic aspects of the empirical study, and discuss the validity of the study 
despite such limitations and obstacles.  
2.2.1 Limitation of groups 
Because of the large number of groups, their numerous publications and my own time 
limitations I have had to narrow the number of groups under scrutiny here to three; Jabhat al-
Nusra (JN), The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and Ahrar al-Sham (AS). I have 
chosen these three groups over the multitude of others, as I consider them to illustrate both the 
influence and potency of Salafism (and Salafi-Jihadism) in the Syrian uprising as well as the 
inner disputes and varieties within this current. The three groups are among the largest and 
most influential groups of the armed uprising, both in terms of their geographical span, size 
and the appeal of their ideological message within the Salafi/Salafi-Jihadi flank of the armed 
uprising. I acknowledge that the analysis would benefit from including a forth group 
representing an “Islamist flank” of the armed uprising. However, as this ideological or 
political flank of the armed uprising is by most accounts as heterogeneous as the Salafi-Jihadi 
one, choosing one group for the sake of comparison would be more suggestive than 
conclusive. Furthermore adding a forth group to the analysis would be at the expense of the 
accuracy and depth of the analysis of the remaining three.  
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2.2.2 Limitation of source material 
In the case of ISIS I will further limit the empirical study to the group’s publications as ISIS, 
and not include statements from the group under its former name of Islamic State of Iraq 
(ISI). In other words the empirical body of publications from ISIS is limited to the timeframe 
from April 2013 to May 2014. I will neither include statements published within this 
timeframe regarding the group’s military operations in Iraq unless its presence and actions 
Syria is explicitly mentioned.  
As for AS, the group has been a leading faction in three larger coalitions, The Syrian 
Revolutionaries’ Front (SRF),31 the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF) and the Islamic Front (IF). 
Considering AS’ central role in these fronts, I will include the charters, official communiques 
and joint statements from these coalitions in the analysis in so forth AS has signed, or is 
explicitly mentioned or referred to. However, statements and military communiques from 
other member factions of these fronts will not be included in analysis due to the sheer amount 
of material published.  
Finally, whilst JN considers itself part of al-Qaʿida (AQ) and acknowledges the 
authority of Ayman al-Zawahiri I will not include the official statements of the latter as part 
of the empirical basis for the study of JNs ideology unless republished or quoted by the 
group’s official media wing. The same goes for ISIS in the time-frame of its (at least formal) 
affiliation with AQ until February 2014. Whilst the ideological influence of al-Qaʿida on ISIS 
and JN is undoubtable there have also been ideological debate and disagreements. Whilst the 
extent of both similarities and discrepancies are of obvious interest and relevance it is worthy 
of a study in itself and falls outside the scope of this paper. Statements of al-Zawahiri, as well 
as other members of the al-Qaʿida leadership will however be included in so forth that they 
are informative about the evolution of the groups and their relations to al-Qaʿida itself. 
Similarly there are other statements from other armed groups, ideologues and supporters 
which are of potential relevance. Where such publications shed light on the abovementioned 
three’s ideology, military operations, actions in rebel governance or rebel infighting, they will 
be included to illustrate the context and changing dynamics of the groups.  
Due to own time restrictions, I have limited the timeframe of the empirical materiall to 
two and a half years, from January 2012 to May 2014. However as the conflict is still on-
going and statements published after May 2014 or prior to January 2012 might shed light on 
past developments, this time frame is treated pragmatically.  
                                                 
31
 Not to be confused with its namesake, the Syrian Revolutionaries’ Front established by 15 armed factions 
affiliated with the Free Syrian Army in December 2013. 
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2.3 Remarks on the authenticity, reliability and validity of 
the empirical material 
2.3.1 The selection of empirical material 
As for the task of gathering a “complete” body of publications it is problematic not solely due 
to the vast amount of material published, but also the nature of the channels of publications. 
Over the course of the study, all three groups have gradually come to rely heavily on social 
media as their primary channels for publications. As some of their published material has 
been of a brutal and violent character, they have increasingly been subjected to online-
censorship and removed. Similarly, their second type of publication channels, namely central 
online jihadi forums, are regularly shut-down for shorter or longer timespans. That said, 
publications removed or in other ways made unavailable from their original channels, have 
for the most part been collected and subsequently re-distributed online by analysis and 
researches, as well as via blogs and social media profiles run by what is commonly referred to 
as the “online jihadi fraternity”. In particular the most important speeches and film clips from 
the leadership of the group gain a near “canonical” status within the jihadi movement through 
widespread redistribution online. Thus, claiming complete overview over all official online 
publications is hardly possibly, however I consider the size and content of my “empirical 
collection” substantial enough to complete this analysis with a high degree of accuracy.  
As for “unofficial” publications which are not published via the group’s official media wings 
or web pages, such as pamphlets, graffiti, murals, banners and school books, my access is 
limited to what the groups choose to publish online or what other groups or activists 
republish. The same goes for speeches, meeting protocols, verdicts from sharʿia courts and so 
forth. The inaccessibility of such “unofficial” publications and the impossibility of my 
presence at such public appearances constitute an obvious obstacle to gaining a complete 
overview of the manifestations of the group’s ideology. However, even if a complete 
overview of all publications is not obtainable, I do not regard this empirical shortcoming of 
such severity as to overshadow the importance of the study in itself. Furthermore I consider 
the large extent and varied content of the actual collected body of publications to moderately 
compensate for this empirical shortcoming.  
As for the content of the official publications, I will include written texts and speeches in the 
analysis. Poems and militant hymns (anāshīd) will not however be included partially based on 
a necessity to delimit the empirical body to a feasible amount. Although such literary 
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expressions are clearly illustrative of the groups’ discourse, I consider the content of a more 
symbolic character and thus less informative and direct than speeches, military and political 
statements.   
2.3.2 The authenticity of the content 
Another obvious challenge related to the empirical material concerns the authenticity of the 
publications as there have been several known examples of “false statements” and false flag 
operations, and potentially many more yet unknown.  The procedure of verifying the 
authenticity of the source of the publications largely depends on the group’s own control and 
oversight. However as the groups’ have paid great attention to this subject and published 
corrective statements where both false statements and unofficial media channels are rejected, I 
consider the risk of including such fake statements into my study to be relatively small.  
2.3.3 Reliability of the information in the publications  
As my study is primarily based on the material published by the groups themselves, another 
obvious dilemma is the reliability of the information they provide. It would be naïve not to 
presume that the groups display a degree of self-censorship as well as self-praise in their 
publications. Similarly, one should expect that parts of their activities will be presented in a 
particularly favorable way, whilst other activities are neglected in their online self-projection 
of themselves. I have chosen to treat this dilemma pragmatically by limiting my focus to the 
self-projection of the group’s ideology and their discursive practice, thus rendering the 
dilemma of the reliability of the information they publish less relevant. For instance, a 
promotional film clip from one particular group showing combat training of children cannot 
be used as unequivocal evidence proving that the group actually deploys minors in armed 
operations. Such film clips is however evidence that the group use children in the role of 
soldiers in their propaganda, and consequently indicating that the group to a certain extent 
endorse children soldiers in principle. To compare, a different group who does not publish 
films of children in combat training, might still employ minors in armed operations. 
Following this logic, my empirical material does not allow me to speculate about what certain 
groups “really” wants, what they “really do”, or if they have hidden intentions or agendas. 
That said I consider the following in-depth study of what they actually say, and claim to do, to 
be indicative of what their actions and agendas if not offering a complete picture. 
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Consequently I consider this study to be more than an analysis of mere propaganda but also 
informative of their aims, priorities and actions.  
Finally secondary sources such as reports and articles from researchers, journalists or 
activists, constitute a natural and necessary supplement by providing important additional 
information regarding the group’s activities.  
2.3.4 Inequality of source material  
As the three groups have had different focus in their PR-campaigns, the mapping of their 
military operations and combat activities suffers from an inequality of source material. For 
instance JN has established a media wing solely for the purpose of reporting their daʿwa 
activities and relief work. Further, the group have published numbered military communiques 
regularly where their military activities, cooperation and targets are documented. AS and ISIS 
on the other hand have published a large number of film clips where both combat and non-
combat activities are documented, but the regularity of these as well as the degree of details in 
terms of location, duration and cooperation varies greatly. And whilst media reports to a 
certain extent might compliment and even out this empirical imbalance, their focus on ISIS 
and JN at the expense of AS for obvious reasons, constitute another empirical imbalance.  
2.3.5 Inner divergences and variations of each group 
As with any organization or group the three groups under scrutiny here are not entirely unified 
and coherent entities, but rather encompass rivalling personalities and trends. Whilst such 
inner divergences and variations can at times be discerned through gradual changes, they have 
been not discussed or included in the groups’ own official publications. As such, this study 
will not touch upon the competing trends, inner rivalries and differences within each group. 
Similarly, it should further be emphasized that this study concerns itself with the ideological 
production of these three groups, whilst not addressing the extent of its endorsement among 
the groups’ own members. As such it should be noted that amongst the many reasons while 
people have, and continue to, join the ranks of the three, ideology is but one – and 
endorsement of the groups ideology is not necessarily a requirement for joining the group or 
fighting alongside it.
32
 
                                                 
32
 See for instance the survey of 50 fighters, including members of AS and JN, briefly outlined in the article cited 
under. Whilst the number interviewed were limited, the researchers notes a high degree of support for a 
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2.4 Language and translation loss  
Another issue worthy of mention relates to the fact that the texts, film clips and audio tapes 
forming the empirical basis of this study are with few exceptions in Arabic. As is the case 
with any language, translating sections of text will by necessity involve degrees of translation 
loss.
33
 Additionally, religious terminology and certain key concept with a centrality within 
Islamic theology have acquired different meanings within various religious schools, sectarian 
groups or religious communities. As such, dogmatic or theological differences between say 
Shiʿite and Sunni Muslims can sometimes manifest itself at a word-level with the result that 
one particular concept used might be used differently or have a different value or centrality 
depending on the speakers religious beliefs and background.  
As the rhetoric and discourse of the groups constitutes a central aspect of this study, the 
accuracy of the translations is of the outmost importance. Thus, I have chosen to leave some 
the central key concepts untranslated and instead provide a partial translation in parenthesis or 
a more extensive explanation in footnotes. If not specified otherwise, all translations are my 
own. 
Furthermore, in the translation of the publications of the groups I have taken the liberty of 
omitting some of the repeated, formulaic expressions, such as “May His peace and prayers be 
upon him” after every mentioning of the Prophet. These are frequently used expressions in 
discourse of the groups under scrutiny in this study, as well as political parties and everyday 
speech. Although such expressions underline the religiosity or religious character of the 
speakers discourse they are arguably not of any deeper or more informative significance. 
Because of the high frequency of such expressions in everyday discourse, and the lack of 
parallel common expressions in English, I have chosen to omit some of them so as not 
“foreignize” or “exotify” the language to the English reader. For the same reason I have 
chosen to translate the Arabic (Allāh) to English God.  
                                                                                                                                                        
democratic system, as well various motivations for joining AS and JN spanning from better fighting conditions, 
medical aid and the common cause of removing the Assad-regime. Vera Miranova, Loubna Mrie, Richard 
Nielsen and Sam Whitt, “Syria’s Democratic Jihad: Why ISIS Fighters Support the Vote”, Foreign Affairs, 13 
January 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2015-01-13/syrias-democracy-jihad. 
33
 The ambiguity, associations and connotations of a certain word in the source language might not be reflected 
in the nearest equivalent word in the target language. In the case of Arabic some argue that this is particular 
problematic as the richness of the language is not only manifested in its large vocabulary but also at word-level 
in the multitude of meanings and connotations a single word can embody. Furthermore many of the central key 
concepts in Arabic which have become somewhat semantically synchronized with the English equivalent 
concepts, they still retain some of the connotations, associations and uses from its own cultural-linguistic history. 
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2.5 Ethical considerations 
This study has been conducted in accordance with the guidelines for research ethics at 
University of Oslo
34
 in addition to the guidelines presented by the National Committee for 
Research Ethics in the Social Sciences and the Humanities (NESH).
35
 There are additionally a 
number of problematic issues and ethical dilemmas related to studying an ongoing conflict, 
and in particular one of such complexities as the Syrian civil war, which should be offered 
some consideration. 
Firstly, in-depth analysis of the three groups would ideally be accompanied by an 
equally thorough and detailed account of their spatial and temporal context. However, in 
practice a more extensive overview of the conflict and the discourse of opposition far exceed 
the scope of this study. I have compensated for this by interweaving what I consider to be the 
necessary background and chronology of the Syrian conflict with an overview with the 
emergence end evolution of these three groups in the first empirical chapter. This is chosen 
primarily for two reasons. Firstly, I consider a chronological presentation of the conflict’s 
evolution the best way to accurately illustrate its complexities. And secondly, the central role 
of the three groups considered, an introductory narration of the conflict would be incomplete 
without including the three, whereas a division into two separate chapters would make for a 
tediously repetitive read. That said, the necessary alternation between an in-depth focus on the 
three groups and a briefer and more generalized review of the broader landscape of groups 
and oppositional movements should not be interpreted as a reflection of the actual influence 
and importance of the former in the conflict.  
Secondly, there are a number of problematic issues related to the increasingly sectarian 
aspect of the conflict, referring to sectarian motivated violence and the militarization of 
minority communities,
36
 but also the normalization of sectarian animosity in the groups’ 
rhetoric and narratives of the conflict based overwhelmingly on religious/sect-based 
generalizations. One problematic issue is how to accurately analyse the groups’ discourse and 
their use of derogatory terms of religious communities whilst not endorsing their application. 
                                                 
34
 “Etiske Retningslinker”, Universitetet i Oslo, 18 February 2011, http://www.uio.no/om/regelverk/etiske-
retningslinjer/ . 
35
 “Forskningsetiske Retningslinjer for samfunnsvitenskap, Humaniora, Juss og teologi”, Forskningsetiske 
Komiteer, 24 April 2012, http://www.etikkom.no/Documents/Publikasjoner-som-
PDF/Forskningsetiske%20retningslinjer%20for%20samfunnsvitenskap,%20humaniora,%20juss%20og%20teolo
gi%20(2006).pdf. 
36
 Joseph Holliday, «The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War», Middle East Security Report, 
No. 8, Institute for the Study of War, March 2013, 
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/TheAssadRegime-web.pdf, 18. 
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To best portray the groups discourse I have chosen to deploy such derogatory terms in my 
analysis whilst writing them in brackets to attribute the use of such terms to the groups as 
opposed to myself. Similarly, generalization regarding whom the groups’ refer to as “the 
Jews” also forms part of their discourse and subsequently becomes relative to my analysis. In 
a similar manner I will refer to whom the groups refer to as “the Jews” in brackets. In regards 
to the sectarian aspects of the conflict it should be noted that whilst the increasing 
politicization of ethnic and sectarian identities is an important mobilizing dynamic of the 
conflict and as such should not be neglected, it should neither be emphasized as the main 
driving force. Painting a picture of the country as an ethno-sectarian mosaic where civil war 
has always been in the cards, neglects the long history of co-existence and cooperation across 
sectarian and ethnic identities, just as it neglects the fact that ethnic and sectarian minorities 
are present in most camps of the opposition as well the pro-regime flank.  
Thirdly, I consider the general lack of transparency from all sides partaking in the 
conflict precluding a clear overview of the conflict to be a practical as well as an ethical 
dilemma. Central issues such as transnational (and national) alliances, the involvement of 
regional powers, channels of funding, rebel infighting and war crimes are subjects where 
verifiable information is scarce but accusations are plenty.  As my main focus is on the 
group’s own publications and how they themselves portray their role and modus operandi, I 
consider this weakness to be of less gravity. In cases were the groups’ information is scarcer 
and/or highly biased, such as their engagement in rebel infighting and rebel governance, I 
have to a greater extent supplemented with information from media, activists and observers. 
Where this is the case I will clarify the nature of the source and discuss its reliability.  
Fourthly, I have chosen to refer to the group that calls itself the Islamic State of Iraq 
and al-Sham, as such or abbreviated as ISIS - reflecting the way the group refers to itself. The 
use of a definite article preceding the group’s chosen name should however not be interpreted 
as a recognition or a legitimation of the group’s self-professed status as “a state” nor as being 
Islamic.   
Fifthly, the three groups refer to some of their members or other individuals 
considered religious authorities by honorary titles such as doctor, shaykh, ʾamīr (commander 
or prince) and amīr al-muʾminīn (commander of the faithful). I will include such titles in 
quotations and other contexts where its use is relevant to illustrates the position and esteem 
such individuals hold within the group. However, as such titles are considered to be signs of 
religious authority and respect by a population much larger than the supporters of these 
groups alone, I will not apply such titles in references to such individuals in my own analysis. 
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Finally, I must acknowledge my role as an observer with a geographical distance to 
the conflict, and enclosed in a public discourse on Syria which have shifted from starch 
condemnation of the regime to an “anti-terror” angle arguably benefitting the regime. 
Additionally, as a former student in the country with friends and acquaintances greatly 
affected by the ongoing war, my remoteness in kilometer does not translate into detachment. 
Thus, I have attempted to my greatest effort to offer an objective analysis of one flank of the 
opposition built on the empirical material available whilst leaving causal suppositions and 
condemnations aside.  
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3  Chronological overview 
The Syrian uprising and subsequent war is commonly traced back to events in Derʿa in 
mid-March, shortly after popular uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia had succeeded in ousting 
their presidents. The Mohammad al-Buʿazizi37 or the Khalid Saʿid38 of Syria was a small 
group of school children spray-painting anti-regime slogans in the city of Derʿa south of the 
capital.
39
 Their arrest and torture at the hands of the notorious security services sparked 
demonstrations in the southern city, and the subsequent brutal attempts to quell the growing 
public manifestations of opposition merely caused them to increase and spread to other parts 
of the country. However, similar to Egypt and Tunisia, the discontent that fuelled the uprising 
in Syria ran deeper and stemmed from a multitude of political, economic, social and religious 
issues with a history much older than March 2011. In short, during the presidency of the two 
Assads (Hafiz al-Assad 1971-2000, Bashar al-Assad 2000-…) any oppositional movements of 
a political or religious nature had met harsh repression and any upsurge of violence or 
attempts at regime change had been met crushed with overwhelming force.
40
 The political and 
economic elite of the country was largely concentrated around the Assad extended family, and 
their allies within the Sunni merchant class.
41
 The religious ʿAlawite minority, to which the 
Assads pertained, were disproportionately represented in the political leadership, the echelons 
                                                 
37
 Mohammad al-Buʿazizi was a Tunisian fruit vendor who set himself on fire in protest 17 December 2010 and 
became a popular symbol for the subsequent popular uprising in the country.  
38
 Khalid Saʿid was a young Egyptian reportedly beaten to death by the police 6 June 2010, and who 
posthumously became a mobilizing symbol (and protagonist of the viral online campaign “We are all Khaled 
Said”) in the Egyptian popular uprising in 2011.  
39
 Derʿa is commonly portrayed as the “birthplace of the revolution” in popular narratives, but public 
demonstrations also erupted in the city of Banyas as early as 18 March. “Popular Protest in North Africa and the 
Middle East (VI): The Syrian People’s Slow-motion Revolution”, Middle East/North Africa Report No. 108, 
International Crisis Group, 6 July 2011, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Syri
a/108-%20Popular%20Protest%20in%20North%20Africa%20and%20the%20Middle%20East%20VI%20-
%20The%20Syrian%20Peoples%20Slow-motion%20Revolution.pdf 11. 
40
 The most well-known example is the Muslim Brotherhood dominated uprising which arose in the mid-70s and 
ended with the bombing of Hama in 1982, see for instance, Raphael Lefevre, Ashes of Hama: The Muslim 
Brotherhood in Syria (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 81-129. More recent examples include the 
“Damascus Spring” in 2000-01 and the Qamishli uprising in 2004. For more on the former, see Joe Pace and 
Joshua Landis, “The Syrian Opposition: The Struggle for unity and relevance, 2003-2008”, in Demystifying 
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of the army hierarchy and the security services.
42
 The list of other potential and 
complimentary push- and pull-factors for igniting a protest against the regime goes on with 
rising cost of living, marginalization of the provinces, rivalries between different flanks of the 
ruling cadre, a growing Salafi-movement,
43
 a devastating drought,
44
 economic liberalization 
without mechanisms for redistribution of wealth,
45
 severe limitations on freedom of speech, 
widespread surveillance from an infamous secret police, oppression and large restrictions on 
the civil society.
46
 In sum, the glass of discontent was already filled to the brim and the events 
in Derʿa appeared to be merely the last drop.  
Whilst Bashar al-Assad had come to be seen as a relatively moderate force in the 
region, not least by a number of European countries
47
 the regime’s response to the uprising of 
2011 was far from moderate. Neither the political “carrot” of promising reforms and elections, 
nor the “stick” of increased state violence, surveillance and arrests, managed to quell the 
growing public display of dissent and discontent.
48
 The regime portrayed itself as guarantors 
of security, secularity and the protection of the country’s religious minorities whilst framing 
the uprising as a whole as a “foreign conspiracy” largely led by “terrorists.”49 Simultaneously 
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releasing former fighters in Iraq, their recruiters and facilitators from prison summer 2012 - 
arguably infused the uprising with a cadre of motivated, experienced fighters of various 
degrees of Salafi-Jihadi inclinations.
50
  
In the camp of the regime loyalists and supporters were large parts of the old economic 
and political elite (with the exception of early defectors), sections of the army, security 
services and a growing number of pro-regime militias. Among its regional allies, the regime 
came to count on the financial, military and vocal support primarily from Iran, the Iraqi 
(Shiʿite) political leadership, Iraqi Shiʿite militias, and Hizballah in Lebanon. Further China 
and Russia provided financial support, loans, credit lines and crucial vetoes in the UN 
Security Council.  
Arguably in a “middle position” between the opposition demanding regime removal 
and the hard-core regime loyalists, was a number of pre-existing political parties and 
organizations as well as some new formations.
51
 At (the varying degrees of) mercy of the 
regime, these parties have remained inside the country where they call for dialogue with the 
regime and for its gradual reform rather than a complete regime removal. Their presumed 
lenience towards the regime gained them the label of “regime collaborators” by many of the 
oppositional groups. Whereas most of these “middle position” parties and groups has not yet 
gained any larger influence or importance in the post-2011 Syria, the Kurdish Democratic 
Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, PYD) and its armed wing the People’s Defence 
Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, YPG) are noticeable exceptions.
52
 Whereas the party’s 
political thrust in Damascus is less noticeable, the group and its military wing had by summer 
2014 established a de facto Kurdish proto-state in Kurdish majority regions and adjacent areas 
in the Northern and North-Eastern parts of Syria. 
Finally there is the third complex and diverse category of the opposition. Already from 
an early phase of the conflict, the opposition was split into three larger “blocks” divided by 
                                                                                                                                                        
Middle East/North Africa Report, No. 109, International Crisis Group 13 July 2011, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Syri
a/109%20Popular%20Protest%20in%20North%20Africa%20and%20the%20Middle%20East%20VII%20--
%20The%20Syrian%20Regimes%20Slow-motion%20Suicide.pdf 2-4. 
50
 Weiss and Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, 144-149. 
51
 Most of these parties joined efforts in The National Coordination Body for Democratic Change (NCB) 
established June 2011. for more on NCB, see “National Coordination Body for Democratic Change”, Syria in 
Crisis (Blog) Carnegie, 15 January 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=48369. And for more 
on the disputes within NCB, see Aron Lund, “A Rift in the National Coordination Body”, Syria in Crisis (Blog) 
Carnegie, 31 January 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=54381.  
52
 For more on PYD/YPGs emerging role in the Syrian conflict, as well as its position within the complex 
topography of Kurdish parties see, «Syria’s Kurds: A Struggle Within a Struggle», International Crisis Group 
Middle East Report, No. 136, International Crisis Group, 22 January 2013,  
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Syri
a/136-syrias-kurds-a-struggle-within-a-struggle.pdf. 
 19 
 
their preferred means of opposing the regime; non-violent activist,
53
 a political opposition in 
exile, and a growing number of armed factions fighting the regime on the ground.  
The “block” or “flank” commonly referred to as the political opposition in exile refers 
to the many political activists, human rights lawyers, “veteran dissidents”, army defectors and 
religious figures – all attempting to oust the regime primarily through political means from 
outside the country. Over the course of the past four years they have joined efforts in the 
establishment of a number of parties and councils, most prominently the Syrian National 
Council (al-Majlis al-Wataniyy al-Suriyy, or SNC) established August 2011, the Syrian 
National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (al-Iʾtilaf al-Wataniyy li-
Quwa al-Thawra wa-l-Muʿaraaa al-Suriyya, hereafter referred to as the National Coalition or 
NC) established November 2012, and the Syrian Interim Government (al-Hukuma al-
ʾIntiqaliyya al-Suriyya, SIG) initiated March 2013. The initiatives of the political opposition 
in exile have largely been precluded by personal rivalries, juggling the interest of its rivalling 
patrons
54
 and the insufficient means and experience to carry the daunting task and unrealistic 
expectations following its appointment as “the legitimate representative of the Syrian 
people”.55 Their main link with the armed opposition has been through their support of the 
Free Syrian Army, and later in the establishment of the coordinating structure of the Supreme 
Military Council.
56
 
As for the multifaceted and diverse assembly of the numerous armed oppositional groups,
57
 it 
has, much like the political opposition in exile, been unable to form a unified force on the 
ground. Whilst the first armed groups seemingly emerged as an extension of the 
demonstrations early autumn 2011, the armed opposition evolved into a different “flank” of 
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the opposition altogether as the conflict became increasingly militarized. Whilst the label of 
“Free Syrian Army” (al-Jaysh al-Suriyy al-Hurr, FSA) echoed in the many announcements of 
armed groups and a central leadership of the FSA became established in Turkey, it did not 
evolve into the formalized or centralized army it name implies.
58
 Whilst the formal leadership, 
itself harbouring inner rivalries,
59
 have remained close to the political opposition in exile, it 
has arguably failed to create stable links and a centralized command over the many diverse 
armed groups carrying its banner.
60
  Further an armed faction’s affiliation with FSA 
commonly overlapped with its membership in larger armed coalitions or alliances inside the 
country. In sum, the militarization of the conflict fostered some groups which carried the 
banner of FSA and others not, as well as coalitions united by geographical proximity, 
ideological similarities or mere pragmatics. As such the ideological heterogeneity, size and 
scope of each coalition varied greatly. And regardless of whether they remained affiliated 
with the FSA-banner and/or –leadership, most of them evolved into separate units with their 
own names, banners, leaders and a public presence online. This is the case for two of the three 
main protagonists of this analysis which publically entered the scene of the armed uprising in 
January 2012.  
3.1 The establishment and early evolution of Ahrar al-
Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra: 
Ahrar al-Sham
61
 announced their establishment publically in January 2012, however it had 
been active since June 2011 primarily in the governorates of Hama and Idlib.
62
 The group’s 
leader went by the nom de guerre Abu ʿAbdullah al-Hamawiyy but later went public by his 
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real name, Hassan ʿAbbud.63 The group prided itself as “one of the first organized union of 
battalions” to take up arms against the regime,64 but neither then nor later did it reveal much 
in regards to its activities prior to going public or further details surrounding the 
establishment.
65
  
Like AS, Jabhat al-Nusra (JN)
66
 went public as a group in January 2012 some months 
after its actual establishment. Whereas the details surrounding its establishment was kept 
secret at the time, it was later revealed and confirmed that the group had been established by 
members of the Iraqi al-Qaʿida affiliate, Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) sometime during autumn 
2011.
67
 The secrecy regarding the identity of its leader, going by the nom de guerre of Abu 
Muhammad al-Jawlani, however has remained. 
Yet, the founding statement contained no reference to the ISI or AQ whatsoever. 
Rather JN’s message and rhetoric largely likened that of AS, whilst also vaguely hinting at a 
commitment to the imperative of armed jihad prior to the establishment of the group.  
In the months that followed, JN rapidly gained the attention of the regional and 
Western press due to their large scale urban bombings and regular use of suicide bombers – 
tactics which were unprecedented in the conflict thus far. Further, the group’s preference for 
using top-tier jihadi forums for the dissemination of their statements and film clips rapidly 
gained them the reputation as the “Syrian al-Qaʿida branch” or “al-Qaʿida-like group”.  
Over the course of 2012, the growth of JN and AS corresponded with a proliferation of 
armed oppositional groups who increasingly challenged the military hegemony of the regime. 
Both increased geographical scope
68
 and the number of their fighters and member factions
69
 - 
merging with local groups as well as welcoming many of the foreign fighters entering the 
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country, within its ranks. The two further expanded their operational activities to include 
social work, aid distribution, daʿwa, (proselytizing and preaching), and rebel governance.70As 
for their position within the broader topography of the armed uprising, AS formalized their 
alliances with several other larger armed groups in the establishment of first The Syrian 
Revolutionaries’ Front (Jabhat Thuwwar Suriya, SRF)71 and later the Syrian Islamic Front 
(al-Jabha al-Islamiyya al-Suriyya, SIF) - one of the largest fronts outside the “FSA umbrella”. 
JN for their part did not join any such group, but increasingly engaged in military cooperation 
with a large number of other armed groups. Whereas both exemplified a broader trend of 
groups proclaiming their adherence to “the Righteous Predecessors” and conceptualizing their 
fight as jihad, and similarly rejected the efforts of the political opposition in exile, this did not 
necessarily entail a rejection of FSA linked groups as collaborators on the ground. And even 
if JN was presumed by many observers and armed groups alike to be an al-Qaʿida affiliate, 
the group’s military efficiency and potency seemingly made it a convenient ally regardless of 
apparent ideological differences. An illustrative example of his is the broad support JN 
received when US authorities put it on its list of global terrorists arguing it was a sub-branch 
of ISI and under the direct control of its leader. The decision sparked a wave of protest within 
all three camps of the opposition with central figures of the political oppositional in exile 
condemning the decision and activists organizing pro-JN rallies under banners such as “We 
are all Jabhat al-Nusra”. A common trait in these statements of public support for JN, was the 
seeming irrelevance of the groups presumed affiliation with AQ and the branding of the 
regime as the “real terrorist”.72 By April 2013 when ISI entered the conflict under its own 
banner, AS and JN were arguably among the largest and most influential groups of the armed 
uprising.  
3.2 The entrance of ISIS 
The official entrance of the Iraqi-based al-Qaʿida of worldwide reputation came in the 
form of a statement/audio speech when its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,
73
 confirmed the 
group’s links with JN and announced the merger of the two under the new name of the 
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Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham.
74
 ISI’s decision to enter the conflict under its own name, as 
well as its proposed merger with JN, seemingly took place without consulting or even 
informing over-all leader of al-Qaʿida, Ayman al-Zawahiri, nor the leader of JN, Abu 
Muhammad al-Jawlani. The latter responded few days later expressing his surprise over the 
announcement and confirmed their support of ISI, but rejecting the merger of the two. Instead 
he renewed the group’s allegiance to “Shaykh of Jihad, Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri”, thus 
confirming the existence of a previous (secret) pledge, whilst also vouching to “the people in 
al-Sham” that its now public affiliation with al-Qaʿida would change nothing on the ground.75 
The two referred the matter to ʿAyman al-Zawahiri76 who subsequently ordered al-Baghdadi 
to drop “al-Sham” from its name and its agenda, and return to Iraq, whilst JN was to remain in 
Syria.
77
As for the fall-out between the two it was to end immediately. To act as al-Zawahiri’s 
representative in Syria in regards to the implementation and follow-up of his command, he 
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appointed Abu Khalid al-Suri, a commander of Ahrar al-Sham and veteran of the jihadi-
scene.
78
  
The entrance of ISI(S) into the Syrian conflict, the uncloaking of JN as an al-Qaʿida 
affiliate, as well as the apparent fall-out between the two, sparked heated discussions within 
the broader Salafi-Jihadi movement. As for the Syrian opposition with all its flanks, councils 
and factions, few would argue that JN’s affiliation with al-Qaʿida and/or ISI(S) came as a 
complete surprise.
79
 That said, many considered its public affiliation with al-Qaʿida to be 
surprising, and more so, a disadvantage for the group and the opposition as a whole, AS 
among them.
80
  
As for the ripple effects on the ground following ISIS announcement and subsequent 
expansion – particularly in northern Syria - there were several reshufflings of alliances and 
allegiances following ISIS.
81
 Whilst the extent and scope of such changes (from JN and AS to 
ISIS, as well as the opposite) is difficult to assert with certainty,
82
 anecdotal evidence and 
media reports indicated a trend of foreign fighters jumping ships from JN, AS and other 
armed oppositional groups, to join ISIS. On the ground, JN and AS continued to collaborate 
extensively as before; they joined several joint operation rooms together alongside other 
armed groups, cooperated in large-scale operations and even signed a joint statement in late 
September alongside other major factions.
83
 As for their relations with ISIS they cooperated at 
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some fronts, remained peacefully operating side-by-side in some areas, whilst competing for 
influence and clashing in others. In the same timeframe ISIS’ relations with other armed 
groups varied from cooperation, relatively peaceful co-existence as well as growing instances 
of armed clashes and fall-outs.  
Another key event of autumn 2014 was the dissolution of SIF in November 2013 and the 
announcement of a new, larger front with the similar sounding name of The Islamic Front 
(Jabhat al-Islamiyya, IF) 22 November 2013 where Ahrar al-Sham was one of the co-
founding factions.
84
 Other member factions included former groups of the Syrian Islamic 
Front, as well as large parts of the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front (SILF), making IF 
overnight the most numerous,
85
 and arguably the most influential front within the landscape 
of armed oppositional group.
86
 Compared to the SRF and SIF, the charter of the newly 
established IF assured a complete but gradual merger of its joining factions, both 
organizationally, economically, military and politically
87
  – a merger which, at the time of 
writing has yet to manifest itself.  
3.3 The emergence of a parallel intra-jihadi war  
From the outset of 2014 the scattered intra-rebel fighting escalated into a full-fledged intra-
rebel war pitting JN, AS and several FSA-affiliated groups against ISIS.
88
 Armed clashes 
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erupted against ISIS in various locations of the country, of a scope and scale unprecedented.
89
 
Intra-rebel conflicts were now also mirrored in a heated war of words as enmity was now 
publically recognized JN, AS and other armed groups, as well as ISIS, to a much greater 
extent than seen previously. There were also apparent splits within both JN, AS and other IF-
factions regarding whether or not to partake in rebel infighting. During this first month of 
open intra-rebel war, there were attempts of arbitration and reconciliation, however they 
proved largely futile
90
 and ISIS seeming dismissal of these initiatives hardened the others 
critique of the group. By the second month, Ayman al-Zawahiri publically disavowed ISIS – a 
first in the history of AQ.
91
 
Territorially speaking, ISIS was first pushed out of its strongholds in the northwestern 
parts of the country by early January and subsequently barricaded itself in al-Raqqa. Over the 
course of winter and spring 2014 ISIS gradually retook some of it former strongholds in the 
north and northeast through confrontations with other rebel groups (including JN and AS).
92
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Simultaneously in Iraq, the group carved out new territories with its victory in Fallujah and 
Ramadi in January 2014, and more so, its wave of successful offensives in June 2014 taking 
Mosul, and large parts of the Anbar, Ninawa and Tikrit governorates.
93
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4 Self-identified Similarities and 
Differences 
The practice (manhaj) of the battalions in faith and conduct is like the practice (manhaj) of the Sunna and first 
troop (al-raʿīl al-ʾawwal)94 and those among the religious scholars who followed their example in adhering to 
the book of God and the (genuine) Sunna of his Prophet, may God’s peace and prayer be upon him. (…) [T]hey 
are the righteous predecessors of the umma in all but contemporary affairs.
95
  
       
From Ahrar al-Sham’s official web-page (undated) 
 
Jabhat al-Nusra are from the sons of Islam and Sunni Muslims (ahl al-sunna wa-l-jamāʿa). They took up arms 
and joined for the victory of their religion and the victory of their umma.. (…)[T]they are from the followers of 
the righteous predecessors (al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ), following the methodology of Sunni Muslims  in creed (ʿaqīda), 
behaviour (sulūk) and practice (manhaj).” 96 
  
    Sami al-ʿUraydi of Jabhat al-Nusra, October 2013  
      
“We seek absolution from God from every statement contradicting to the methodology (manhaj) of the people of 
the Sunna, which is the known as the methodology (manhaj) of the Islamic State by which all of our commanders 
(ʾumarāʿ) govern.” 97 
Statement by ISIS, March 2014 
As shown in the quotes above the three groups define themselves as (Sunni) Muslims, and 
more specifically as adherents of the practice and creed of the righteous predecessors (al-salaf 
al-ṣāliḥ). In addition to their self-definition as mujahidin (holy fighters), and less frequently as 
revolutionaries, this constitute the key pillars of their self-definition. As such they present 
themselves first and foremost as Sunni Muslims acting on behalf of the larger Muslim 
community or the umma, subsequently specifying that they follow the creed and practice of 
the righteous predecessors. This religious self-identification is repeatedly highlighted in their 
publications. Further, whether recounting military operations or addressing political issues, 
their publications are sprinkled with frequent quotes and references to the religious scripts 
(the Quran and the Sunna). Their successes are always attributed to God, and their actions, 
strategies and decisions are often accompanied by a suiting reference from the religious script. 
This fundamental similarity notwithstanding, the groups do differ. And, whilst 
upholding the ideal of creedal unity, the groups have acknowledgement their differences to 
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various degrees. In the following I will first review how the group themselves have 
conceptualized their similarities and differences, the extent to which they have addressed 
them. I will also touch upon whether or not their disagreements have amounted to the 
pronunciation of takfīr or excommunication from Islam by proclaiming someone to be kāfir 
(infidel). As leaving Islam either by conversion to another religion or in other ways ceasing to 
believe in Islam is considered to be punishable by death,
98
 the act of excommunication is a 
highly sensitive matter and generally requires extensive proofs of “disbelief”. The principle of 
takfīr is further the primary vehicle for legitimating killings in Salafi-Jihadism. Whilst the 
exclusionist understanding of Islam which characterizes Salafi-Jihadism entails the 
endorsement of takfīr, the conditions and frequency of its application arguably constitute one 
of the key distinguishers within the movement.  
4.1 Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra 
Commencing with the frequency of which AS and JN have included the other in their official 
publications we find a large number of references to military collaborations whereas 
evaluative statements regarding the other are few in comparison. The extensive collaboration 
between the, has thus seemingly two been mirrored in what might be interpreted as a silent 
acceptance and endorsement of the others role in the conflict. On the other hand the two have 
consistently framed their efforts as part of a larger movement of “mujahidin” joint by their 
common aim of establishing an Islamic ruling system in Syria – counterpoised not only the 
regime and its supporters, but also (in less harsh terms) the propagators of a future 
democratic, secular ruling system.
99
 Seemingly considering each other as part and parcel of 
this same largely undefined community or movement of “mujahidin”, JN and AS’ praise and 
critique of the other have been framed within this implied ideological kinship. Thus, in so 
forth as the two have praised the other explicitly, and not simply implied the other in their 
praise of “the mujahidin” in general, they have highlighted the other’s commitment, military 
efficaz and collaboration with other groups towards this joint aim.  
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For instance, with the outbreak of rebel infighting against ISIS in January 2014, 
Hassan ʿAbbud of AS interestingly praised JN as an example to follow for ISIS describing it 
as a group which “doesn’t differ in ideology and authority from ISIS” but which have been 
able to “work hand in glove with other militias” due to their shared commitment to first and 
foremost repel the regime.
100
 JN has for their part recognized the burdens bore by the Islamic 
Front (and by extension AS) in the fight against ISIS and renounced accusations by ISIS of 
the front being “infidel” (kāfir) or having fallen into apostasy.101 
The few instances where the two have criticized each other, it has been directed 
against on the other’s perceived step away from the common aim, the movement, or against 
actions perceived as harming the larger movement as a whole. Their critique of the other has 
thus taken the shape of advice or disappointment, rather than blunt condemnation, dismissal 
or a breach of their long-standing extensive cooperation of the ground. 
A clear example of this is AS critique of JN and Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani’s public 
pledge of allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri. Interestingly AS was amongst those who went out 
in support of JN when it was listed by the US Treasury Department as a terrorist group listing 
its then presumed links with ISI as the official reason given for the classification. ʿAbbud 
dismissed it as an irrelevant Western classification based on religious affinity; “Let them 
classify us.”102 However when JN officially pledged their allegiance to al-Qaʿida, AS offered 
“advice and a reminder” (al-nasḥ wa-l-tadhkīr) (questioned the usefulness and efficaz of this 
official statement – whilst seemingly not questioning the allegiance itself.103 As noted shortly 
after by ʿAbbud; “Our rejection of this [pledge] was because the most important duties now 
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are to push the unjust aggressor enemy of our nation and our people. This is not the time to 
enforce the particular projects of each group, if they so have.”104 When questioned explicitly 
about AS ideological, intellectual and systematic differences with JN, the leader of AS, 
Hassan ʿAbbud, noted vaguely;  
As with other Islamic groups (…) we agree with them on certain points and disagree on others and military we 
agree on some points and tactics, and disagree with others tactics. In other words, they have their own way in 
presenting their approach and adopting ideas and we may agree with in as forth as Islam is the ruling principle 
of our work and we may differ in some of the rulings.
105  
In the same interview however ʿAbbud further praised the efficaz of JN on the ground, their 
commitment to fighting the regime (rather than other “elements of the Syrian revolution”) and 
concluded; “So as long as it remains like this, we welcome working with them against the 
regime.” 106  
In a similar manner JN criticized AS’ (and IF’s) perceived step away from the aim of 
establishing an Islamic State when co-signing the so-called “Revolutionary Covenant”107 – a 
statement Sami al-ʿUraydi (a religious authority in JN) described as “weak and 
submissive”.108 Whilst heated debate ensued between Hassan ʿAbbud and al-ʿUraydi on 
Twitter,
 109
 it did not transform into any larger ideological (or methodological) debate in their 
official publications or a breach of their extensive collaboration on the ground.  
4.2 Ahrar al-Sham and ISIS 
Whilst ISIS first commented on AS existence and role in the conflict when the two fell 
out in January 2014, AS expressed their skepticism towards ISIS early on. Whilst 
acknowledging ISIS’ efforts towards the joint aim of removing the regime and establishing an 
Islamic ruling system in its place,
 110
 AS criticized ISIS claim of “statehood”, their views and 
relations with other groups
111
 and later their categorizing of these other groups as ṣaḥawāt -
alluding to the primarily Sunni Muslim, American sponsored, anti-ISI “awakening” in Iraq. 
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Whilst AS acknowledged the shared aim of establishing an Islamic state,
112
 its leader 
criticized the “nature, shape and timing” of ISIS “state-project” - considered to be colliding 
“with the priorities of the battle in al-Sham”.113  Over the course of autumn 2013 AS criticized 
the practise of ISIS in their relations with other groups in several specific cases, for instance 
with the outbreak infighting between ISIS and ʿAsifat al-Shumal in ʿAzaz; “We consider them 
above spilling the blood of Muslims or rushing to describe them as infidels and apostates.” 
Whilst remaining vigilant and vocal in regards to what they considered to be the flaws of 
ISIS, AS arguably still referred to the group as part of the same largely undefined community 
or movement of “mujahidin” as itself. 
By late December 2013 and January 2014 this was arguably no longer the case as AS’ 
critique of ISIS hardened mirroring the deteriorating relations between the two on several 
fronts - in particular the killing of an AS commander at the hands of ISIS
114
 and its seeming 
dismissal of initiatives of resolution. Whilst the main focal points of their critique remained 
the same - namely ISIS’ claim to statehood and their armed and vocal enmity towards other 
oppositional factions - AS, or more specifically Abu Khalid al-Suri added “extremism” to the 
list. He lamented how the “extremism” (ghuluww) and the killing of fellow Muslims which 
“destroyed jihad in Algeria threatens to destroy the jihad in al-Sham.” He further criticized the 
“behaviour of superiority and arrogance towards the rest of the mujahidin and Muslims in 
general” seen in “the field [of jihad] today”. Whilst not explicitly naming any group in 
particular, his critique of a group “ruling by excommunication (takfīr) and apostasy (ridda), 
and accusing (and imprisoning) factions on the grounds of being ṣaḥawāt (with no proofs) 
clearly implied ISIS. Finally and noticeably, al-Suri rejected the association of key Jihadi-
ideologues (and personal acquaintances) including Usama bin Ladin, ʿAyman al-Zawahiri, 
ʿAbullah ʿAzzam, Abu Musʿab al-Suri and Abu Musʿab al-Zarqawi, with “crimes and 
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incorrect practices being  committed under the name of jihad and the establishment of the 
Islamic state.”115  
When Abu Khalid al-Suri was killed shortly after, allegedly by ISIS,
116
 Hassan ʿAbbud lashed 
out against the group whom they increasingly referred to as khawārij.117 The reference alludes 
to the  5
th
 Century
118
 oppositional (almost anarchistic) sect who declared any Muslim 
disagreeing with them to be an apostate,
119
 and is regarded by most religious scholars for 
showing excess in religion (ghuluww -fī-dīn) – itself a cause for excommunication. Thus, 
Hassan ʿAbbud to a greater extent attacked its ideology and its excessive practice of 
excommunication. ISIS excommunication of factions with links to foreign countries, was 
further transformed into an accusations against ISIS for, following this logic, having 
excommunicated Taliban and Mullah Umar who famously expressed a wish to maintain a 
“good relationship with the rest of the world’s country.” He further highlighted an alleged 
utterance by an ISIS sharʿia official that when a leader commits apostasy, those who have 
pledged allegiance to him also become apostates. ʿAbbud thus argued that ISIS by extension 
thus considered al-Zawahiri, a man who had pledged allegiance to Mulla Umar, an 
apostate.
120 
By June ʿAbbud described ISIS as “bearded versions of shabīḥa” claiming ISIS did 
not “reflect Islam in any way” but rather representing “the worst image ever of Islam”. Whilst 
the exclusion of ISIS from the movement AS considers itself (and JN) to be a part of, and 
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their harsh critique notwithstanding, AS has not (publically) went as far as publically 
excluding or excommunicating ISIS from Islam altogether.
121
  
ISIS for their part offered no statement on AS, nor a response to AS’ critique of the 
group, prior to the outbreak rebel infighting in January 2014. Mirroring the escalating fighting 
and the hardening critique from AS/IF alongside other starch critiques such as Jamal Maʿrouf 
(leader of Syria’s Revolutionaries Front), the two became the subjects of ISIS’ harshest 
accusations. ISIS critique of AS/IF was firstly against their attacks against ISIS-members,
 122
 
secondly against their presumed links and alliances with the political opposition in exile and 
regional states
123
 and thirdly partaking in what they described as a “plot to eradicate the 
Islamic State.”124  
4.3 Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS 
ISIS for their part praised JN upon joining the conflict portraying it as a mere extension of 
itself.
125
 As such their praise of JNs successes and degree of popularity were presented as a 
merit of their own making. When JN subsequently dismissed the proposed merger, ISIS’ 
spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-ʿAdnani described JN as “rebellious defectors” claiming it 
name had simply been a “security and media cover for the presence and operations of the state 
in al-Sham.” 126 Al-ʿAdnani further criticized al-Zawahiri’s acceptance of their pledge of 
allegiance for causing division amongst the mujahidin.
127
 
            ISIS subsequently went quiet in their critique of JN until the outbreak of rebel 
infighting January 2014. Whilst firstly directing their enmity towards Jaysh al-Mujahidin, 
Syria’s Revolutionaries Front and the Islamic Front, by March they dusted off their previous 
accusations against JN of “treachery” and added “insidious evil-doer” to its characteristics.128 
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Additionally the group and its members created a number of wordplays on the name of Jabhat 
al-Nusra  (the supporting front) emerged, referring to it as “jabhat al-khusra” ”(“the front of 
loss” or “the loosing front”) and “jabhat al-ḍarrār” (“the front of destruction”).129 
ISIS enmity against the group was primarily against four factors; 1) JN’s break with ISI(S) in 
April 2013, 2) its “betrayal and treason” by joining in on the attacks on ISIS from January, 3) 
its impure alliance with groups considered by ISIS to be “criminal bands” and “lackeys of the 
West”, and 4) spreading lies about ISIS. In the words of al-ʿAdnani, JN stood accused of 
«launching campaigns to distort the faith and method of jihad” and equalled enemies of the 
State with “enemies of Islam”130 – whilst stopping (very) short of explicitly and publically 
excommunicating JN altogether. 
            JN for their part first spoke critically of ISIS with the outbreak of rebel infighting in 
January 2014. Whilst it dismissed (or more specifically ignored) the proposed merger with 
ISIS in April 2013, al-Jawlani had nothing but praise for the group. Not only did he express 
gratitude for the initial help the group receive upon its establishment, but al-Jawlani further 
praised the virtues of ISIS stating; “God almighty knows that we saw only great goodness and 
generosity from our brothers in Iraq and their virtues cannot be counted.”  And whilst 
asserting their independence from ISIS, al-Jawlani described its links with the group as one of 
patronage, assistance and respect, rather than subservience. JN and al-Jawlani subsequently 
kept quiet on what was largely described as a fall-out between the two by jihadi-forums
131
 and 
analysts alike. First in an interview with al-Jazeera in December 2013 al-Jawlani commented 
on the incident, describing it simply as a “brief disagreement” between the two which had 
been largely exaggerated by the media.
132
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With the fall-out of January 2014, al-Jawlani first criticised ISIS and its attackers 
alike.
133
 The latter were described as “some traitor parties (…) exploiting the situation in 
order to achieve Western objectives” or “personal interests”, whilst ISIS was partially blamed 
for “augmenting the conflict” due to their “wrong policy (al-siyāsa al-khāṭiʾa)”. 134 As for its 
own role, al-Jawlani declared “their innocence” from the ongoing fighting, but stated that JN 
would defend itself if attacked.  
Over the course of January JN’s criticism of “the attackers” muzzled, while the 
condemnations of ISIS hardened – in particular after the killing of one of their own 
commanders, Shaykh Abu Saʿd al-Hadrami135 and even more so after the killing of Abu 
Khalid al-Suri (23 February 2014). JN’s gradually hardening critique of ISIS was largely 
centered around the same topics as uttered against the group by AS, namely ISIS’ claim to 
statehood,
 136
  their fight against other groups and their reluctance to solve their issues with 
these groups.
137
 ISIS’ ideology became increasingly under criticism with accusations of 
extremism, indicated by referring to the group as khawārij. ISIS’ alleged excommunication of 
anyone not agreeing with them, was further presented as a sign that the group had deviated 
from the ideology of al-Qaʿida (and by extension JN itself).138 Whilst suggesting 
excommunication (through the accusations of excessive excommunication) of ISIS, JN did 
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not officially cross the line. And whilst the group continued to encourage a resolution of the 
conflict with ISIS, and continued to collaborate with ISIS in some areas, it had ousted the 
latter from their category of allied mujahidin in their discourse.  
4.4 What is the extent to which they conceptualize their 
differences and does it include takfīr (excommunication)?  
To sum up, the three groups’ officially pronounced opinion of the each other has firstly 
changed over the course of the conflict, largely mirroring the groups changing relations on the 
ground. Secondly, whilst JN and AS have continued to frame their praise and critique against 
each other within the framework an implied ideological kinship, the fall-out with ISIS in 
January 2014 entailed the exclusion of ISIS from this implied community. Thirdly, whilst 
ISIS on the one hand, and JN and AS on the other, have come close to the pronunciation of 
excommunication of the other, they have not explicitly done so in so many words. At the 
same time their key arguments for potentially doing so is arguably interlinked with diverging 
views on the necessary conditions for excommunication in itself.  
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5 Centrality of Jihad 
So we announce a general call to arms for the sons of the Front in particular and the people of jihad in general 
in the land of al-Sham. 
139
    
Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani of Jabhat al-Nusra, May 2012 
 
The Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham opens the door of recruitment to every Muslim who wants to do jihad for 
the sake of God, from emigrants (muhājirīn) and helpers (ʾanṣār), so come O’ youth of Islam from everywhere 
(…) come to the good of the world (dunyā) and hereafter, come to the life, since there is no life without jihad140 
       
Abu Muhammad al-ʿAdnani of ISIS, January 2014 
 
To our people, the reluctant and free we say: By God, we did not depart but for jihad in the path of God to 
oppose the injustice amongst you, and put an end to the period of humiliation and enslavement which that 
criminal band has conducted upon you.
141
 
      From Ahrar al-Sham’s official web-page (undated) 
 
Whilst it is God who, according to the three groups, will ultimately decide the future of the 
Assad-regime, they have for their part contributed to its fall by mobilizing to (armed) jihad. 
All three have announced a general call to arms (nafīr) to waging (armed) jihad against the 
current regime in Syria.
142
 They conceptualize their warfare as jihad in the path of God (jihād 
fī sabīl illāh), and describe themselves as mujahidin (lit. those who fight jihad). As such their 
commitment to (armed) jihad has become a central part of their self-presentation and self-
perception. 
To be sure, the Syrian war has fostered a number of groups, which by endorsing a 
democratic future Syria disqualify as typical Salafi-Jihadis, but nonetheless conceptualize 
their fight as “jihad” and their fighters as mujahidin.143 As such it could be argued that “jihad” 
has become integrated in the broader discourse of opposition in the Syrian conflict, just as the 
typical Salafi beard has become symbol of opposition.
144
 Thus the conceptualization of the 
war as jihad, as well as the use of religious terminology, symbolism, and Salafi rhetoric and 
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discourse is not a key characteristic setting the three clearly a part from the majority of the 
groups, nor a distinguisher between themselves.  
However whereas the three groups expresses similar, if not identical, views on the 
legitimacy and obligation of jihad in the Syrian civil war, an in-depth read of their 
publications reveal some differences regarding what might be referred to as the centrality and 
exclusivity of (armed) jihad, for instance; 1) consistency of their self-presentation as 
mujahidin, 2) the role of armed jihad juxtaposed other non-violent forms of activism, 3) the 
necessity (or lack thereof) of waging jihad after an eventual fall of the Syrian regime, and 4) 
their identification (or lack thereof) with a broader transnational jihadi movement.  
5.1 Consistency of their self-presentation as mujahidin 
Firstly, a review of the frequency of the word jihad in the three groups’ official publications 
reveals less consistency in the framing of the war as jihad in the discourse of AS, than JN and 
ISIS.  
Commencing with the former, AS has alternated between framing the ongoing events 
in Syria as a revolution (thawra) and jihad, and its partakers as both revolutionaries (thuwwār) 
and mujahidin,
145
 as exemplified by the following quote by its leader Hassan ʿAbbud: “[T]his 
revolution is a revolution of the people and this jihad is the jihad of the umma.”146 Whilst the 
distinction between revolutionary and mujahid is used, at times, to indicate different flanks of 
the opposition (though rarely pointing out which groups they consider to belong to which 
category)
 147
 we also find the two conflated in the description of other fighters
148
 as well as to 
denote AS itself. The founding charter of SIF interestingly steered away from applying both 
the concept of revolution and revolutionary as well as jihad and mujahid in describing itself as 
well as its actions and aims, whilst simultaneously emphasizing its adherence to sharʿia and 
cooperation with other groups based on a shared religious understanding.
149
 In the charter of 
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IF however it presented the front as factions “united in jihad” aiming to further unite “mujahid 
factions” in Syria whilst at the same time speaking of the “path of the revolution”. 150 On 
Twitter its self-definition as mujahidin is seemingly more frequent than revolutionary,
151
 
whilst in his interviews with Al Jazeera Hassan ʿAbbud uses the concepts of “revolution” and 
“revolutionaries” at a substantial higher frequency than “jihad” and “mujahid”.152  
As for JN and ISIS, the concept of jihad and mujahidin is mentioned in every speech 
of their leaders, as well as those of their scholars. Whilst there are some examples of JN 
referring to the broader uprising in Syria as a revolution,
153
 the religious framing of their own 
fighting as jihad is highly consistent. In the case of ISIS, a sole reference to “the revolutions 
of the Arab spring”154 constitutes the exception to the rule. As for other concept of revolt and 
popular resistance, they have even advised against their use of such “words and concepts alien 
to the mujahidin” – most prominently in al-Adnani’s critique of over-all leader of al-Qaʿida 
ʿAyman al-Zawahiri.155 
5.2 The role of armed jihad juxtaposed other non-violent 
forms of activism 
As seen, the legitimacy and the virtues of jihad constitute central and repeated themes 
in the three groups’ publications. However, some of their statements and utterances suggest 
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different stands on the “exclusivity” of jihad as a way to establish an Islamic State and unite 
the umma amongst the three. Put differently, the groups endorse a slightly different repertoire 
of methods, manners and means of activism and protest they consider to be legitimate and/or 
in accordance with Islam, a part from (armed) jihad. And, similarly the groups show various 
degrees of acceptance towards other groups’ and individuals’ diverging preferences in this 
regard.  
To be sure, none of the three include (party) politics, popular elections or democracy 
as part this repertoire. However they show varying degrees of acceptance and rejection 
towards other groups or organizations who either oppose the regime through political 
channels or fighting with the establishment of a democratic system as an end-goal. Whereas 
AS and JN have expressed their skepticism towards the “secular ideology” fronted by the 
FSA leadership, their links to the political opposition in exile, their lack of unity and 
efficiency,
 156
 and their support from Western power, they have largely refrained from 
criticizing FSA-linked groups directly on the basis of their ideology. Rather, both AS and JN 
have spoken of the jihad as driven forward by “mujahidin” as well as “revolutionaries.” 
ʿAbbud has even stated that the aim of establishing an Islamic State is one shared by the FSA. 
157
  And whilst both groups have highlighted the religious character of the uprising, they have 
with few exceptions refrained from criticizing any presumed lack of religiosity and piety of 
other armed groups explicitly, seemingly elevating the importance of military cooperation 
above that of ideological and methodological uniformity; “The front [JN] found a formula to 
harmonize with all the non-marginalized factions, especially those who pledged to fight al-
nuṣayriyya (derogatory term for ʿAlawites158), resulting in narrowing the effort (…) to serve 
jihad, the religion, and ṭawḥīd (unity in creed and rank) (…) despite divergence in thoughts 
and methodology.”159  
                                                 
156
 Hassan ʿAbbud described FSA in June as “more a concept than an entity.” Hassan ʿAbbud, interviewed by 
Taysir ʿAlluni (11 June 2013). 
157
 Ibid. 
158
 The term Nusaryi refers to the founder of the sect, Muhammad ibn Nusayr, and used to be the common name 
for the sect prior to the French colonialism. Whereas the now preferred term of ʿAlawite alludes to ʿAli a figure 
of great importance to both Sunni and Shiʿite Muslims, Nusayri arguably alludes to the perception of the sects 
“man-made” origin.Whilst scholars disagree as to whether or not the term Nusayri constitutes a derogatory term, 
or whether it is simply a neutral historic term, the way it is used by the three groups leaves little doubt as to 
whether or not they consider it to be derogatory – and it will as such be treated as a derogatory term in this 
analysis. 
159
 Abu ʿAbd Allah, “Wa law Annahum Faʿalu ma Yuʿazuna bihi la-Kana Khayran lahum” (If they had done 
what they were admonished to do, it would have been better for them), Muʾassasat al-Basiraʾ li-ʾIntaj al-ʿIlam, 
16 March 2014, 24:56, http://jihadology.net/2014/03/16/al-ba%E1%B9%A3irah-foundation-for-media-
production-presents-a-new-audio-message-from-jabhat-al-nu%E1%B9%A3rahs-shaykh-abu-abd-allah-al-shami-
but-if-they-had-done-what-they-were-in/.  
 42 
 
The fact that ISIS has criticized other armed groups on this basis has become a key 
argument in JN and AS’ critique of the group.160 At the same time the two have been keen to 
disavow ISIS’ claims that they themselves are coordinating with the political opposition in 
exile (and by extension the West and America).161  
ISIS for their part has consistently referred to the implementation of democracy, a 
civic state or a nation-state as “a plan from the enemy”162 - conceptualized either as al-
rawāfiḍ,163the West or even the Saudis.164 The armed groups which support this “plan”, and 
consequently oppose the aim of ISIS and “the state” itself, are branded as saḥawāt165 or 
alternatively referred to as an “an agent and participant with the Jews and crusaders, and a 
new tyrant”.166 By January 2014 it even declared the National Coalition and the Supreme 
Military Council to be a “sect of apostasy and unbelief (kufr)” and a legitimate target for the 
groups.
167
 
As for daʿwa (proselytizing and preaching) this constitutes a priority for all three 
groups, forming part of their training, their public outreach and their Islamic image. All three 
groups have published a number of film clips showing daʿwa-sessions, and, in the case of JN 
and AS, created separate media wings or social media profiles for the dissemination of daʿwa-
related material, speeches or film, clips.
168
  
However whereas daʿwa appears to be an essential supplement to (armed) jihad by JN 
and ISIS,
169
 quotes from AS might suggests that daʿwa could potentially surpass jihad in 
importance in the future, such as the following; “And if the reasons for carrying arms in our 
country should fall away, then a Call to the Truth (al-daʿwa ʾilā al-ḥaqq) will still be 
resolute/unwavering (as it) outlines the path to insight, and pave the way for the restoration by 
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building the true Muslim (hu)man.” 170 In comparison, I have not found a similar opinion 
expressed in the publications of the other two groups.  
The difference between the three groups is most clear however when it comes to their 
stands on engaging in non-violent activism. Whereas statements from AS (and by extension 
SIF and IF) have described non-violent activism as insufficient to force regime change at the 
current,
 171
 they have not dismissed such efforts or rejecting them as un-Islamic all together. 
JN and ISIS on the other hand, have described what they consider to be the futility of non-
violent activism per se - in the context of the Syrian civil war and beyond. 
JN for their part portrayed armed warfare as not only as the sole legitimate way to 
remove the sitting Syrian regime, but also as the only way possible;  
The people of Sham must realize that this regime will not fall but with the strength of God and then by the 
strength of weapons. So taking up arms for the people of al-Sham is not a shame or blameworthy, whereas being 
ruled by the laws of the jungle rather than the law of God (sharʿia) is. 172 
 
ISIS has for its part has rendered peaceful measures to implement an Islamic state, 
peaceful coexistence and as well as the goal of peace itself, to be un-Islamic, inadequate
173
  
and submissive.174 In the words of al-ʿAdnani; “if peaceful means really could preserve 
dignity or end falsehood, then the Prophet, God’s peace and prayers upon him, would not 
have let a drop of blood be shed and God Almighty would spare us the burden of jihad.” 175 
Al-ʿAdnani has even equaled peace to an idol or false god, and, following this logic, thus 
equaling pacifism to polytheism.
176
 In sum, ISIS has explicitly annulled the legitimacy of 
anything but armed jihad (supplemented with daʿwa) as means to reject the current regime, as 
well as change the current predicament of the Islamic umma.  
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5.3 Jihad after Assad 
Whereas the three groups all agree on the legality, validity and duty of (armed) jihad in Syria 
at the current, they have expressed different stands on whether or not to continue waging jihad 
after the eventual fall of the Assad-regime. This relates to the geographical scope of the 
groups’ agenda, their hierarchy of enemies and whether or not they base the legitimacy of 
jihad on the Syrian context or not. Commencing with their geographical scope (chapter 8) AS 
has to a greater extent than the other two upheld a national narrative of the conflict, ISIS the 
most explicitly regional and potentially also global, whilst JN occupies the grey areas between 
them. As for their “hierarchy of enemies” (treated more extensively in chapter 7) AS and JN 
have to a larger extent upheld endorsed the targeting of actors or parties active in the Syrian 
war, whilst ISIS operates with less contextualized perception of enemies.  
Finally the third indication relates to the contextualization of jihad and whether jihad 
is deemed legitimate due to the severity of the conflict, or alternatively whether jihad is 
legitimate per se at this current juncture of history.  
Commencing with AS the group has consistently contextualized and legitimized “their 
jihad” by emphasizing the gravity of the Syrian conflict, as exemplified in the following self-
presentation from the group’s official web-page;  
To our people, the reluctant and free we say: By God, we did not depart but for jihad in the path of God to 
oppose the injustice amongst you, and put an end to the period of humiliation and enslavement which that 
criminal band has conducted upon you. We shall not be but an armor protecting you, and a drawn sword upon 
your enemies. (…) So continue on the path of revolution and do not turn away from this blessed choice.177 
 
As such, the group has emphasized the insufficiency of non-violent activism in the face of 
regime brutality, rather than the “holiness” of jihad in itself.178 Thus, AS commitment to jihad 
appears to be temporary until their main goals are achieved, namely regime removal and the 
establishment of an Islamic State - at least judging by the group’s official statements. In 
comparison, the publications of JN, and even more so ISIS, to a greater extent present an 
idealized and de-contextualized perception of jihad per se lasting from now and until 
judgment day. At the extreme end of the scale in this case is ISIS who has promoted a meta-
narrative of an eternal jihad since their entrance into Syria. (Armed) jihad in their view is not 
solely limited to the countries it operates in at the current, but rather part and parcel of a larger 
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borderless jihad between Muslims and non-Muslims, faith (ʾimān) and disbelief (kufr),179 and 
the truth (al-ḥaqq) and the wrong (al-bāṭil).  By seeing themselves as part of an eternal fight, 
against eternal enemies their timeframe of their jihad thus becomes infinite. As such, there is 
no apparent deadline or logical end-date to ISIS’s jihad but judgment day. 180  
In the middle of the three we find JN which alternates between contextualizing and 
eternalizing jihad. On the one hand we find examples where al-Jawlani expresses a far more 
pragmatic and gradualist view on jihad than found in the discourse of ISIS where the 
receptiveness for jihad amongst Syrians is emphasized in the legitimation of (armed) jihad has 
a means – as opposed jihad being unquestionably legitimate per se;  
“Al-Sham wouldn’t be ready for it [jihad] if it hadn’t been for the Syrian revolution. (…) As the regime here was 
very oppressive it meant that the people were very far from the idea of carrying arms, or accepting the 
methodology which we carry. (…) That is why this revolution pushed away and removed many obstacles and 
paved the way for us.”181  
Whilst the superiority and legitimacy of jihad is unquestioned, al-Jawlani seemingly 
claims its success presupposes certain conditions, such as a degree of popular accept. For 
instance, in the group’s first public statement, al-Jawlani described a popular Islamic uprising 
within the country where “the call for jihad” and the willingness to wage armed jihad 
presupposed JN’s establishment and engagement in the conflict. As such the group did not 
portray itself as a vanguard or pioneer in spreading Salafi-Jihadism or even armed jihad to 
Syria, but rather as a faction which joined a current already on the rise. Thus, according to al-
Jawlani the engagement of JN in the conflict was “called for” and wanted by the “people of 
al-Sham” as they realized the necessity of (armed) jihad. 182 There are quotes from al-Jawlani 
indicating that similar conditions are under development in Lebanon, however the group has 
primarily framed its actions in the country against Hizballah rather than the prelude to a larger 
uprising.
183
 Parallel to this gradualist approach to jihad, JN has presented a vision of an 
eternal jihad much like the one seen in the discourse of ISIS; “The blessed Jihadi movement 
on the land of Al-Sham has proven that it will restore to Islam its role in the region that was 
plundered to stand as an impregnable barrier and fortified bastion before all that is being 
plotted from cunning against this land.”184 
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5.4 Identification with a broader Salafi-Jihadi movement 
and other fronts of jihad 
The final aspect to be treated here related to the centrality of jihad in the groups’ discourse, 
and arguably also in their self-perception, is the three groups’ identification with a larger 
jihadi movement - or the lack thereof.  
Commencing with AS, the group has to some extent presented itself as part of a 
broader movement, seen for instance in addressing “our brothers in the rest of the factions of 
mujahidin» or “we praise our brothers and the rest of the mujahidin.”185 At the same time, the 
group has repeatedly asserted its independence from any transnational group, organization or 
state – whether AQ or the political opposition in exile.186 This ambiguity is further visible in 
its stands regarding JN and its AQ-affiliation. AS first defended JN when it was put on the US 
Treasury Department’s list of global terrorist based on its presumed affiliation with ISI. 187  
However when JN’s al-Jawlani publically pledged his allegiance to ʿAyman al-Zawahiri, AS 
described the pledge as being disruptive whilst not criticizing the affiliation with AQ 
explicitly.
188
  
Whilst the group has included central jihadi- and reportedly AQ-veterans admits it 
ranks, most prominently Ayman al-Zawahiri’s chosen mediator in Syria ʾAbu Khalid al-Suri, 
the former engagements and affiliations of its founding members prior to 2011 and their 
preexisting stature within the jihadi movement has not formed part of their self-
presentation.
189
 Rather AS has been stingy on the biographical details of their members, even 
when deceased.
190
 Anecdotal evidence suggests that central parts of the group’s leadership 
were veteran fighters from uprising against the regime in the 1970-82 uprising, fighters with 
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previous experience from other “fronts of jihad”, and/or former inmates of the notorious 
Saydnaya prison.
191
 Amongst these former inmates were the over-all leader of the group, 
Hassan ʿAbbud (alias Abu ʿAbdullah al-Hamawi) of whom we still know little more than his 
(potential) origin in the Syrian city of Hama as implied by his nom de guerre. In addition to 
al-Suri, AS’ top leadership included several other known “jihadi-veterans”, amongst them 
Muhammad Ayman ʿAbd al-Tut (alias ʿAbd al-ʿAbbas al-Shami) and Bahaʿ Mustafa Jughl 
(alias Abu Hamza Jughl).
 192
  
It could perhaps be argued that the group has not actively sought the endorsement or 
approval of key Salafi-Jihadi groups or central ideologues, by primarily publishing their 
material on their own webpages and social media rather than top-tier jihadi forums.
193
 Thus 
whereas there the group seemingly included the necessary key personas with a past and a 
prominence to promote the group as a part and parcel of a broader transnational jihadi-group, 
it seemingly chose to actively distance itself from such an image. Whilst AS has presented 
itself as part of a larger community of mujahidin, the self-presentation as a home-grown 
phenomenon is more salient in its discourse.  
As for JN, the group has since its foundation identified themselves as “people of 
jihad” and as mujahidin with a commitment to the imperative of armed jihad preceding the 
establishment of JN and the Syrian crisis. Already in the group’s first statement, al-Jawlani 
vaguely insinuated that the group’s members were in fact operating somewhere else prior to 
their engagement in Syria, and merely returned to “their” land from an undefined place to 
protect “their” people.194 - thus hinting of a commitment to (armed) jihad preceding the 
outbreak of the Syrian conflict. Although suggested and speculated at the time whether this 
undefined place was in fact neighboring Iraq, this was neither confirmed nor denied by the 
group until April 2013. What the passage did show however was that the group (or more 
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specifically its founding members) identified themselves as “people of jihad” and as 
mujahidin with a commitment to the imperative of armed jihad prior to the establishment of 
JN.  
The group’s spatial and temporal adherence to a broader jihadi movement has later 
been emphasized more extensively, as illustrated by a later speech by al-Jawlani;  
“We are the fruits of the global jihad that emerged, and part of the long history of struggles and sacrifices of the 
umma. For example, if it hadn’t been for the jihad in Egypt in the sixties, it [ed. jihad] would not have moved to 
Afghanistan, and if it was not for the jihad in the eighties against this regime in Syria it would not have moved to 
Afghanistan, and if it was not for the brothers who gave sacrifices in Afghanistan, the jihad would not have 
moved to Iraq, and if it wasn’t for the brothers who gave sacrifice and were steadfast in Iraq jihad would not 
have moved to the land of al-Sham.”195 
 
Thus parallel to their self-portrayal as defenders of the people in al-Sham/Syria and as 
part of a Syrian “jihadi awakening,” JN identify themselves as a part of a broader Salafi-jihadi 
movement transcending the Syrian conflict. In comparison, I have found no similar quotes 
from AS. 
Whereas the above mentioned aspects of their self-portrayal in statements and films 
have been consistent throughout the group’s existence, the portrayal of their link with ISI and 
al-Qaʿida has not. Rather the group’s affiliation with al-Qaʿida Central evolved from vague 
denial to actively sporting the brand. Despite widespread and long-standing rumors claiming 
JN was in fact allied with the Iraqi al-Qaʿida affiliate and by extension the leadership of al-
Qaʿida itself, the group refrained from commenting such allegations. From its founding 
statement, the group’s preference for using top-tier jihadi forums for the dissemination of 
their statements and film clips rapidly gained them the reputation as the “al-Qaʿida-linked”196 
or “al-Qaʿida-like.”197 But neither then, nor when accused of being an al-Qaʿida affiliate by 
the US treasury, did the group deny or approve these claims. First after the group’s affiliation 
with ISI(S) and al-Qaʿida was revealed by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, al-Jawlani addressed its 
affiliation with the two. However where al-Baghdadi had described JN as part and parcel of 
the Iraqi “franchise”, al-Jawlani portrayed the relations between the two as one of patronage 
and assistance rather than sub-ordinance. Whilst rejecting the announced merger of the two, 
al-Jawlani instead renewed the group’s pledge allegiance to “Shaykh of Jihad, Shaykh Ayman 
al-Zawahiri”; “we give a pledge of allegiance for obedience in good and bad, in emigration 
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(hijra) and jihad, and [pledge to] not to dispute with our superiors unless we see clear proofs 
of disbelief.”198 
As for the cause of the secrecy surrounding its affiliation with al-Qaʿida, al-Jawlani stated; 
The issue of postponing the declaration of the affiliation was not due to a softness in religion or inanition that 
occurred to the men of the Front. Rather it was an enlightened wisdom based on sharʿia principles and a long 
history and spending an effort in understanding the sharʿia policy that is appropriate for the reality in al-Sham. 
However whilst acknowledging al-Zawahiri as his superior, al-Jawlani further addressed “the 
people in al-Sham” emphasizing that the group would not change but continue as before.199 
However from late fall, and in particular after its fall-out with ISIS evolved into armed 
conflict January 2014, the group’s affiliation with al-Qaʿida evolved from being a neglected 
and seemingly irrelevant fact, to an increasingly emphasized credential. Observers noted in 
late autumn that in some areas the group has changed the logo of their banners from “Jabhat 
al-Nusra” to “Tanẓīm al-Qāʿidat fī Bilād al-Shām” or “Tanẓīm Qāʿidat al-Jihād fī Bilād al-
Shām.”200  By spring references to JN as al-Qaʿida in al-Sham started appearing in the group’s 
official publications.
201
 The group's official media wing further posted film clips showing the 
group’s training camps named after AQ-authorities, such as Ayman al-Zawahiri camp and 
Abu Ghadiya camp.
 202
 However, most notably in this regard are the publications of a several 
film-clips posted from March/April 2014 via JNs own media wings, showing central al-
Qaʿida figures and veterans speaking favourably of the group whilst criticizing ISIS, 
seemingly from inside the country. In several of this film clips, the speakers were introduced 
by a biographical presentation where their personal links with AQ-authorities such as Usama 
bin Ladin and Abu Musʿab al-Zarqawi where emphasized.203  
Finally, more than simply considering itself a part of the broader jihadi movement, 
ISIS have increasingly described itself as its vanguard challenging the position long held by 
AQ and its leadership.  
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To be sure, the history of its affiliation with al-Qaʿida includes a number of examples 
where the recommendations and demands of the latter where ignored by ISIS and its 
forbearers. Whether or not the group was technically subordinate or not to the leadership of 
al-Qaʿida prior to al-Zawahiri’s rebuke (February 2014) relates to two interlinked questions to 
which ISIS and the leadership of al-Qaʿida have given different answers; 1) whether a new 
(secret) pledge of allegiance (bayʿa) was made to the Usama bin Ladin after the death of al-
Zarqawi – the only one who publically pledged such an allegiance on behalf of the group, and 
2) whether by declaring the Islamic State of Iraq (October 2006) the group surpassed the 
authority of the leadership of al-Qaʿida itself bound by its pledge of allegiance to Mullah 
Omar in Afghanistan.  
In its first statement as ISIS upon its entrance into Syria these questions had yet to be 
addressed by the group as well as the al-Qaʿidan leadership however already then the group 
indicated that their authority over ISIS was more of a symbolic character.
204
 
When al-Zawahiri subsequently rejected the re-labelling of the group as ISIS and the 
geographical expansion the name symbolized, al-Baghdadi bypassed al-Zawahiri’s authority - 
explicitly considering the judgement of their own sharʿia council’s superior to that of al-
Zawahiri.
205
 In the subsequent months ISIS’ propaganda machinery commenced a campaign 
to legitimize the group’s continued presence in Syria where the encouraging of groups and 
individuals to pledge allegiance (bayʿa) to al-Baghdadi became a central component. Thus, 
rather than issuing a general call of arms encourage people to join the mujahidin in Syria in 
general, they encouraged them to join their own ranks;  
We call on the people of the Sunna [Sunni Muslims] in general and the people of Iraq in particular: to 
join the ranks of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. (…) Verily the State opens its doors of recruitment for 
every Muslim who wished to jihad against the apostates (rawāfid) for the victory of the people of al-Sunna 
[Sunni Muslims].
 206
 
Further, proceeding al-Zawahiri’s official rebuke of ISIS (February 2013) ISIS 
commenced a media campaign to highlight their loyalty and adherence to “the original goals 
and aims” of AQ as represented by the speeches of central AQ ideologues and figures, 
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including Anwar al-ʿAwlaki,207 Usama bin Ladin,208 Shaykh Abu Yahya al-Libi,209 Abu 
ʿUmar al-Baghdadi,210 Abu Musʿab al-Zarqawi211 and Shaykh Abu Hamza al-Muhajir.212 
In these promotional videos, speeches from these key figures were accompanied with 
ISIS’ own photos and films to directly interlink and legitimize their operations and the 
targeting of their (new) enemies amongst Syrian rebel groups. 
 In sum, al-Baghdadi fall-out with the over-all leader of al-Qaʿida, Ayman al-Zawahiri, 
has been portrayed as exactly that in the group’s publications, rather than as a more 
fundamental departure from the ideology, goals and agendas al-Qaʿida arguably represents. 
Put differently, ISIS critic of al-Qaʿida has largely been reserved to al-Zawahiri, rather than 
al-Qaʿida as a whole. As such ISIS has not distanced itself from the al-Qaʿida brand after 
being officially rejected by the group. On the contrary they have highlighted themselves as the 
“true inheritors” of Bin Ladin, al-Awlaki and al-Libi’s legacy – implicitly as well as explicitly 
rejecting al-Zawahiri’s legitimacy. The group has come to describe themselves increasingly as 
the only real and true mujahidin at the expense of (and with harsh critique) of other factions.  
5.5 What is the centrality of (armed) jihad in their 
discourse? 
Whilst the three groups have supplemented their (armed) jihad with other non-combat activities, such 
as daʿwa, aid-work  and rebel governance, they have explicitly (and repeatedly) stated that it is 
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(armed) jihad (“and the will of God”) which will cause the fall of the Assad regime, and clear the path 
for the subsequent establishment of an Islamic state. However whilst AS consider armed jihad to be 
the only possible way to remove the regime, JN and ISIS have on the other hand described it has the 
only legitimate way. And, whilst statements from AS indicates that it armed jihad is amongst 
their top two priorities for now (alongside daʿwa) their actions could be limited to the latter in 
the future. Thus whilst AS legitimation for the armed jihad at the current predicament and in the 
current crisis is contextualized with the Syrian crisis, and the fight against the Assad-regime, it is a de-
territorialized and de-contextualized legitimation of jihad found in the discourse of JN, and more so, 
ISIS. In sum, it could be argued that ISIS and JN evokes jihad as part of their raison d’être to a larger 
extent than AS. 
 
 53 
 
6 Visions and manifestations of an Islamic 
State 
 
What concerns us is that the sharʿia be implemented and justice prevailed and lifting the injustice over the 
people and the righteous Islamic government established on the methodology of the prophet hood that’s seek to 
liberate the Muslim lands, and implements the sharʿia of God Almighty, and threats the people fairly and lifts the 
injustice over the people, this is our quest.”213 
     Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani of Jabhat al-Nusra, January 2014 
We want to put an end to this period of injustice, tyranny and coercion and replace it with a state which confines 
with the aspirations of the people in so forth that it is a state governed by the true sharʿia (al-sharīʿa al-ḥanīf).214
      
Hassan ʿAbbud of Ahrar al-Sham, June 2013  
As for our political project, it is the project of the umma. Our goal is to establish an Islamic State on the 
methodology (manhaj) of the prophet, which doesn’t recognize borders nor differentiate between an Arabs and 
non-Arab, Easterner or Westerner, except with piety. Its loyalty is to God alone (…).215  
Abu Muhammad al-ʿAdnani of ISIS, July 2013 
 
The opposition’s raison d’etre can be boiled down to the dual mission of firstly removing the 
Assad-regime and secondly replacing it with “something better”. For Jabhat al-Nusra and 
Ahrar al-Sham, this “something better” has since the start of the conflict been conceptualized 
as some version or another of an Islamic state. The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), 
for their part, considers itself to be that very Islamic State manifested, as indicated by its 
chosen name. The three groups thus share the key objective of establishing a politico-religious 
entity with Islam at the fundament. In the following I will explore how and where their 
visions and ambitions regarding an Islamic state differ, primarily seen through the lens of 
their discourse but complimenting with examples from their actions in rebel governance.  
6.1 An Islamic state vs. the Islamic state 
First of all, the aim of establishing some version or another of an Islamic state has been 
explicit, consistent and long-standing for JN and ISIS - less consistently for AS. 
Commencing with JN, the group has from an early phase expressed their explicit aim of 
replacing the current regime with an Islamic state   216  - alternately conceptualized as an 
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Islamic state
217
 or as “an Islamic rule,” “Islamic governance,” 218 or “the governance of 
God.”219 The continued commitment to this aim has further been repeated and underlined in 
numerous statements and speeches.
220
  
AS has for their part expressed a similar aim in a number of central speeches, 
statements and charters. Similar to JN, AS has alternated between described their vision for a 
post-Assad Syria as an “Islamic state”,221 “an Islamic, just and rightly guided (rāshid) system 
of governance”,222 and “an Islamic, civilized society in Syria ruled by the law of God”.223 
Whilst the conceptualization of this aim has varied, it has remained consistent with one clear 
exception. Noticeably the “Revolutionary Covenant” co-signed by IF articulated the aim of 
establishing “a state of law, justice and freedom” with no reference to sharʿia or Islam 
whatsoever.
224
 However when questioned about it shorty after ʿAbbud stated that what kind of 
state the signatories wanted for the future was simply not a topic of discussion at the time 
whereas unity among ranks at the current was.
225
 Later statements from the group have 
confirmed that a future state founded upon Islamic rulings is still of preference – whilst a 
reluctance of conceptualizing it as an Islamic State (a phrase increasingly associated with 
ISIS) was arguably identifiable.
226
 
Finally, whereas the label of an “Islamic state” or a “rightly guided system of governance” 
says little about its build-up, power structures etc., there are indications that the JN and AS 
share some sort of similar vision in this regard. For instance the two co-signed a joint 
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statement 24 September 2013 alongside nine other armed factions
227
 where they agreed on the 
common aim of “establish[ing] an Islamic state under sharʿia in Syria”.228 
ISIS, on the other hand, did already pronounce the establishment of the Islamic State 
of Iraq in 2006 which according to the group marked its transformation from a mere group 
into a fully functioning Islamic state. This self-perception (and self-presentation) as a state did 
not change when it officially entered the Syrian conflict and added al-Sham to its title. Rather, 
the move into Syria and the proposed merger with JN was presented by its official spokesman 
as a territorial expansion and a symbolic “elevation” of the existing state.229 The group’s 
insistence to “statehood” was emphasized explicitly in a speech by Abu Muhammad al-
Adanani, ISIS’s official spokesman, few months after entering. Largely responding to critique 
from other groups, Abu Muhammad al-ʿAdnani stated that ISIS was not a “cardboard state” 
(dawla kartūniyya), nor “an illusionary state” or only “existing on the Internet” but rather a 
real entity.
230
 Their self-perception and self-presentation of being a state was further presented 
by al-ʿAdnani as indicative of their advanced efforts in implementing the rulings of sharʿia; 
“As for our insistence on being called “the State” it is because we continue to be the 
spearhead facing the disbelief (kufr) and injustice (ẓulm) which to its best efforts seeks to 
establish the law of God (sharʿia), and cooperate with other Muslims for its complete 
implementation.”231   
As I have mentioned briefly previously and will go further into in the following ISIS 
(and later IS’) self-pronounced role as a state and later caliphate has been rejected as 
illegitimate by both JN and AS. Thus, immediate and arguably overarching difference 
between the three is found in the role they portray for themselves in the establishment and 
daily management of the Islamic state. Whereas ISIS claims to be the Islamic state JN and AS 
have to a greater extent portrayed themselves as the proponents and facilitators of a future 
Islamic state. As will be discussed at greater length in the following, this key difference 
between ISIS and JN/AS is further reflected in most other issues related to the groups’ 
conception of an Islamic state.  
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6.2 Visions of an Islamic State 
Whilst specific details on their preferred ruling system are scarce, there appears to be a 
stronger clarity as well as a consensus amongst the three regarding what it should not be. The 
three have rejected fundamental ideological or political principles such as democracy, 
secularity and nationalism - either explicitly for being “contradictory to Islam,” 232 “imposed 
by foreign countries”, 233 or implicitly embedded in their rejection of the efforts of the 
National Coalition
234
 or their inadequacy exemplified by the failure of the Morsi-led 
government in Egypt.
 235
 
236
 
Whilst AS has simply dismissed such political systems, ruling principles and/or 
ideologies as incompatible with Islam,
237
 JN and ISIS has went further in portraying them as 
(in their views) against human nature or even human decency. For al-Jawlani the 
“abnormality” of a parliamentary ruling system is illustrated by some countries, “who claim 
civilization and progress”, [but] have approved same-sex marriages in parliament despite this 
(according to the text) even if this “contradicts human and even animal nature”. 238 The 
official spokesman of ISIS has for his part branded “the civil democratic state” and “the local 
nationalist state” labelled “Islamic” (their regional and international propagators included) as 
the two primary enemies to their own Islamic state.
 239  
 
Regardless of the different ways they reject such ruling systems, the three groups present 
them, as well as the current ruling system in Syria, as the constituent others of their utopian 
vision of an Islamic state.  
6.3 Institutions and ruling principles of the Islamic State 
Moving on from the superlative-loaded visions to the concrete details regarding the 
institutions, mechanisms of power distribution and even the geographic scope of the groups’ 
envisioned Islamic State, the three share a similar vagueness. As such neither of the three has 
published attempts to re-formulate the historic experiences and the holy visions of an Islamic 
state into a distilled, detailed theory of statesmanship.  
                                                 
232
 ʿAbbud, Hassan. Interviewed by Taysir ʿAlluni. 
233
 Al-Shami, “La-Tubayyinunnahu li-l-Nas wa la Taktumunahu”. 
234
 “Bayan Raqm 1: Hawla al-ʾIʿtilaf wa-l-Hukuma al-Muftarida”. 
235
 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, “ʾIʿlan al-Dawla al-ʾIslamiyya fi al-ʿIraq wa-l-Sham”. 
236
 Al-ʿAdnani, “al-Silmiyya Dīn Man?”. 
237
 See for instance article XV of «Mithaq al-Jabha al-ʾIslamiyya». 
238
 Al-Jawlani, «Wa Qabilu al-ʾAyam Khayrun min Madiha». 
239
 Al-ʿAdnani, “Lan Yadurrukum ʾIlla ʾAdhaʾ”.  
 57 
 
With the exceptions of a few scattered details, all three show a seeming irrelevance of stating 
their stances on such issues at greater length and in greater details. There are however three 
aspects of this state where we find some comparable information, 1) the head of state, 2) the 
principle of shūrā and power-sharing, and 3) the implementation of sharʿia. 
Firstly, all three groups envision a leader for their envisioned state and agree upon 
some absolute demands and requires such as being male, Muslim and “qualified”. In the 
words of Hassan ʿAbbud of AS;  
According to Islam, the head of state should be a Muslim. This does not mean however that we want an 
authoritarian, dictatorial regime which deprives people of their rights. To the contrary, if you look at our history 
in the revolution, we have protected the properties of the Christians.
240
  
 
Al-Jawlani has laid out certain characteristics required of a future ruler, stating; “(…) the ruler 
whoever he is, should adhere the regulations of sharʿia as well as being suitable and 
competent.”241 Whilst remaining vague on how this future ruler will be elected, al-Jawlani has 
not proclaimed ownership over this position but rather emphasized on several occasions that 
JN “will not monopolize the leading of the society.”242 Rather, “what the umma accepts, we 
will accept.”243 
The most elaborate list of qualifications for a future head of state is arguably found 
with ISIS. To be sure, the group has not provided any general, universal guidelines regarding 
the necessary qualifications required, the selection process or the leader’s mandate. However 
seeing as they consider themselves to be the Islamic state and refers to their leader by the 
honorary title of “commander of the faithful” (ʾamīr al-muʾminīn),244 their current chosen 
leader constitutes an illustrative example of the groups practice in this regard. According to 
the group, his legitimacy as a leader, and later as a caliph, rests upon his experience, 
capabilities, religious knowledge as well as his bloodline as he allegedly is a descendant of 
the Quarysh tribe.  
Secondly, all three have groups have endorsed the principle and model of shūrā or 
“consultation” as an authoritative organ in their own organizational structure as well as in a 
future Islamic state. Whilst the possibility of including the local populace in political 
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processes through parliamentary elections and political parties is discarded by the three as un-
Islamic or foreign, shūrā is presented by the three as the Islamic, superior counterpart.  
Commencing with ISIS, the group has on the one hand endorsed the principle of shūrā 
as part of their own system of governance, where the state’s own shūrā -council (majlis al- 
shūrā) consultates with “the commanders (al-wulāt), the governors (al-ʾumarāʾ), the students 
of knowledge and the leadership and members of the state”.245 The group has further noted 
the presence of “emigrants” (al-muhājirīn) represented in their shūrā -council.246 On the other 
hand, ISIS’ al-ʿAdnani warns against the application of the concept of shūrā simply as an 
Islamic vail for what he considers “secularity” or “worshipping democracy” – a claim 
exemplified with the Muslim Brotherhood.
 247
  
Whilst there are no such clear indications that the principle of shūrā is mere cover for 
democracy in their statements, AS and JN are more inclusive in their views on the process of 
consultation. AS, in the words of ʿAbbud, sees shūrā as a ruling principle where consultation 
and “the cooperation with the Umma” constitute oversees or supervises the leader.248 JN and 
al-Jawlani has for their part endorsed the principle of shūrā in the future process of setting up 
the future Islamic state,
249
 whilst continuously emphasizing how it as a collective effort not to 
be monopolized by any one group alone.
250
 Further statements such as the following from al-
Jawlani shows their reluctance to shūrā being conflated with namely democracy, but rather 
presents it as part and parcel of an “Islamic ruling system”; “As Muslims we don’t believe in 
political parties or processes, nor parliamentary elections, but we believe in an Islamic ruling 
system where shūrā prevails and justice is spread.”251  
Thirdly, all three groups consider sharʿia to be the juridical and legal basis for the 
future state. All three have (repeatedly) emphasized their commitment to implementing 
sharʿia both in a future post-Assad state and in areas currently under their control, just as 
sharʿia is the ruling principle of their own actions. 252  The praising and glorification of sharʿia 
is further a common thread in the publications of the three. In the words of ʿAbbud;  
 
[Sharʿia] is a system which regulates the social relationships between people and regulates the system of state 
regarding trade and transactions, and it guarantees freedom for all and forbids people from transgressing 
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against each other. It commands the spread of morality and virtue, and promoting the good and forbidding the 
evil.” 253 
 
The element social justice is similarly attributed to sharʿia in the words of al-Jawlani; “The 
Islamic ruling system (based on) sharʿia seeks to establish justice among all people; the 
powerful and weak, the rich and the poor, the big and the small among them.”254 In the same 
speech he further added; “(…) the Islamic ruling system (based on) sharʿia obliges itself to 
protect the oppressed (al-mustaʿḍafīn) and those under the pressure of tyrants.”255 In a similar 
appraisal of sharʿia, al-Jawlani emphasizes how “sharʿia has rights from women and rights for 
men” even for the “farmer in his land and the worker in his factory.” 256 
Whilst the endorsement and the glorification of sharʿia is shared by the three, the main 
difference between them in this regard is whether or not they support and implement the 
ḥudūd penal code. In brief, the ḥudūd punishment constitutes the harshest penal measures of 
Islamic Law and includes for instance the cutting of hands for theft and stoning for infidelity. 
Although this penal code is part and parcel of shariʿa in theory, it is not the sole penal code 
but its application generally limited crimes considered to be against religion itself. The 
conditions required for ḥudūd to be legitimate is, and has been, a divisive issue amongst 
scholars and ideologues.
 257
 Most argue that the required conditions for ḥudūd is an ideal, 
equal and just Islamic state or caliphate where incentives for crime such as poverty, hunger 
and fundamental inequality are void. Following this logic, some consider the ḥudūd 
punishments to be called for in a future Islamic State, whilst others “postpone” its 
implementation to a post-apocalyptic era.  
In war-ridden Syria, ISIS is the sole group of the three (and to my knowledge of all 
groups) which has systematically implemented the ḥudūd penal code and included the 
undertaking of some of its most brutal punishments in their official propaganda.  
ISIS has not only implemented ḥudūd but fronted it as an example of their aversion against 
partial implementation of shariʿa - something they consider al-Qaʿida of al-Zawahiri to do.258 
The group has not offered any explicit religious argumentation legitimizing the 
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implementation of the penal code in their official publications, but has explicitly disavowed 
“slogans like moderation” in the context of the implementation of sharʿia. 259 
Considering however how the group argues that the conditions required for pronouncing the 
establishment of such an Islamic State are met at the current, following the same logic, so 
might the case for the necessary preconditions for ḥudūd.  
In comparison, the leaders of AS and JN have for their part repeatedly emphasized the 
distinction between shariʿa and the ḥudūd penal code. Rightfully one might say, ʿAbbud 
pointed out in an interview in June 2013 that the two are conflated in the beliefs and rhetoric 
of many harboring negative opinions towards shariʿa, particularly in the West;  
(…) the West suffers from a misconception regarding Islamists in general. We know for example they are 
mistaken regarding sharʿia (…) and think it is just a penal code forced on people, and they don’t know that it is 
a complete way of life.”260  
 
In the interview ʿAbbud continued by emphasizing the virtues and even functionality of 
sharʿia whilst concluding the argument by stating how “sharʿia can’t simply be reduced to 
punishments such as cutting of hands and whipping.” 261 A similar argument is found in al-
Jawlani’s interview with the same channel in December 2013; “For sharʿia does not imply the 
narrow understanding of implementing (one of) the ḥudūd punishments (ḥudūd Allāh), but 
rather to liberate man - all mankind everywhere - from the chains forced upon them, from 
laws made by humans to enslave people to their desires and limited theories making them 
think they know the meaning of well(fare).”262 To be sure, neither ʿAbbud nor al-Jawlani 
dismiss the
 ḥudūd penal code per se nor its potential implementation in a future post-Assad 
Syria. However, they seemingly consider shariʿa implementable without the ḥudūd penal 
code, and has subtly attempts to disassociate themselves from such practices, most clearly 
shown with ʿAbbud’s almost blasé remark on “cutting of hands and whipping”.263 
The fourth contentious issue in regards the establishment and running of their 
envisioned future Islamic State relates to whether or not they endorse the principles of power-
sharing with groups or individuals not officially part of their own organization and potentially 
of different ideological and religious inclinations. Again we find a similarity of ideas 
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expressed by JN and AS and a certain distance between the two and ISIS. JN and AS has 
continuously emphasized that the establishment of this future state is a collective effort and 
portrayed their role as primarily that of facilitators and contributors rather than sole 
authorities. Al-Jawlani of JN has for instance claimed that; We do not seek to rule the country 
rather we seek the implementation of sharʿia in the country – whether or not we are to be the 
rulers, doesn’t concern us.”264 Al-Jawlani does not however exclude JN from partaking in the 
set-up and subsequent ruling of the state itself; “The Islamic State in al-Sham is built by the 
hands of everyone, without excluding any of the main people from among the jihadi factions, 
the authentic Sunni Shaykhs, and our emigrant brothers, nor the leaders of Jabhat al-Nusra 
and its shūrā council itself, who [all] participated in jihad and the fighting in al-Sham.”265 As 
seen here however, the group’s preferred partners include individuals and groups of similar 
ideological and political outlook. Similarly AS, and by extension IF has emphasized that their 
effort is collaborative; “[The Islamic Front] does not see itself as an alternative to the umma, 
nor a monopolist of the Islamic project, rather it thanks the efforts of all loyal men working on 
the scene.”266 
As for ISIS, similar quotes or statements indicating any lenience toward power-sharing 
are largely void unless invitations to join the group itself is to be considered.  
6.4 Ethnic and sectarian minorities 
Another important issue related to the three groups’ visions of an Islamic rule of governance 
is that of the roles and rights of non-Muslim citizens.  
Commencing with ISIS, it has explicitly and repeatedly stated its dismissal of religious 
coexistence with Shiʿite Muslims.267 Whilst clearly embedded in the upper echelons of their 
enemy “hierarcy” (Chapter 7) no such dismissal is found in regards to Jews and Christians. 
Judging by their statements Christians are allowed to remain in lands which has fallen under 
the control of the group whilst under strict restrictions and in under the condition that they pay 
the religious tax (jizya).
268
 By February 2014, the group established the first dhimma-pact 
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(Pact of protection)
269
 with the Christians of al-Raqqa which, under the condition that they 
pay the religious tax of jizya, are allowed to remain in the area, continue to practice their 
religion – but away from the public eye.270  
Whilst AS and JN did not implement such measures in areas under their control during 
the time frame of this analysis, they have seemingly endorsed the institution of protected 
minorities (dhimma) and the tax of protection (jizya) with their many references to historic co-
existence between Muslims and Christians as a model for their own treatment of minorities.  
AS has repeatedly emphasized their commitment to protect the lives of non-Muslim 
citizens as well as their livelihood and right to practice their religion - at the current as well as 
in their envisioned post-Assad Syria. An example of this stand is provided by Hassan ʿAbbud 
in an interview with Al-Jazeera in June 2013;   
They [religious minorities] have absolute freedom in practicing their religion. We are the ones who guarantee 
them this, and we guarantee them protection, and security and protect their businesses and so on. However when 
it comes to the head of state being from a minority, being a Christian, we say according to Islam, the head of 
state should be a Muslim. This does not mean however that we want an authoritarian, dictatorial regime which 
deprives people of their rights. To the contrary, if you look at our history in the revolution, we have protected the 
properties of the Christians.
271
 
 
Their position on securing coexistence between religious and ethnic minorities is stated in 
charter of both SIF
272
, IF
273
 and the Revolutionary Covenant.
274
 It is further presented as part 
and parcel of their legal obligations as prescribed by shariʿa rather than lenience towards 
Western demands. It is noticeable however how his exemplification of “minorities” 
consistently leaves the Shiʿite, ʿAlawite or Druze religious communities unmentioned, always 
referring to the Christians as an example. ʿAbbud has however stated in an interview with 
BBC, that ʿAlawites would not be ejected from a hypothetical future Syrian state ruled by the 
Islamic Front.
275
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JN has in a similar manner outlined the rights of minorities in an Islamic state by 
reference to Islamic history; “minorities have existed side by side Muslims for 1400 years 
under an Islamic system which has a conceivable ruling over the minorities, and in this 
system there are rights that should be done to these minorities, and obligations that these 
minorities should do.” The group has however presented an alternative version of the history 
of al-Sham narrating the central battles which have taken place there; where the Romans, 
Jews, Crusaders, colonizers, the “corrupt, oppressive, immoral regimes” “planted” by the 
West in the region, and the “rāfiḍa (rejectionists) of Persia” – all have opted for 
domination.
276
 In this “version” the Shiʿite and Jewish minority explicitly (and Christians 
implicitly) are presented as eternal enemies to (Sunni) Islam and Muslims in the region. In 
sum, the group upholds a stand of acceptance towards the co-existence of religious minorities 
in their envisioned future Islamic state, whilst invariably categorizing them as either historic 
(or current) enemies to this project. 
6.5 Timing and conditions of its establishment 
As touched upon previously, one of the most obvious disagreements between the three related 
to the issue of an Islamic state is the timing and preconditions of its establishment. ISIS 
clearly believes them to be met at the current as they claim to be the Islamic state reborn. The 
other two have rejected the legitimacy of this claim whilst vague in their own stands.  
Prior to ISIS’ official entrance into Syria neither JN nor AS offered the issue of the 
timing or necessary preconditions for establishing an Islamic state any greater attention in 
their discourse or publications. Seemingly the official establishment of an Islamic state was 
treated as a task postponed to a post-Assad scenario. The issue of the timing and the necessary 
preconditions for officially pronouncing an Islamic state gained new relevance with the 
entrance of ISIS and its claim to be the Islamic state manifested.  
Firstly, JN and AS have stipulated that the official establishment of an Islamic state (or 
alt. an Islamic governance) will take place after the fall of Assad,
277
 or in the words of al-
Jawlani, when “Damascus, or larger parts of it falls, or when almost 80% of it has been 
liberated.”278  
Secondly, both JN and AS has argued that amongst the prerequisites for the 
establishment of an Islamic state, is the consultation with a broader spectrum of scholars and 
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groups through shurā (consultation).279 They argue that the establishment of an Islamic state 
must be the result of a collaborative, inclusive effort, rather than the project of one group 
alone. ISIS exclusivist claim to statehood is thus criticized for disrupting the unity such an 
Islamic state aims to create.
 280
  
Thirdly, both JN and AS have arguably fronted a gradualist approach of their jihad, 
their implementation of sharʿia, as well as an eventual state building process. Both groups 
have highlighted the particularities of the Syrian situation in their argumentation for a 
gradualist approach.  
AS for their part proclaimed that the establishment of the Islamic state would take 
place “through legitimate means and strategic foresight taking into consideration the situation 
of our people in Syria after the decades of illdoings by the Baʿth regime and its persistent 
attempts to distort the practice (manhaj) of excommunication (al-takfīr) midst the sons of our 
people.” 281 The group further emphasized the imperative of daʿwa (proselytizing and 
preaching) as a prerequisite for the establishment of this Islamic order.
282
  
JN has for their part encouraged a “softer” and “more patient” daʿwa as Abu 
Sulayman al-Muhajir of JN notes; “Especially since these people have lived under centuries 
of repression, under a tyrannical, oppressive, disbelieving and sinful rule - so be easy with our 
family in al-Sham!”283 This considered, the envisioned Islamic state of JN and AS is draped 
with popular legitimacy as it is framed not merely as their own choice or preference, nor as 
the sole religiously legitimate option, but also as reflecting the “will of the people”. 
Describing a state ruled by sharʿia, ʿAbbud has claimed it is “a state which confines with the 
aspiration of the people” 284 and that it’s establishment is a goal shared by “the Free Syrian 
Army, the Islamic Front, Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham.”285 Al-
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Jawlani has for his part stated that their envisioned plan is one they share with “the general 
public and all the factions”.286  
ISIS for their part has repeatedly and explicitly defended the legitimacy of the 
establishment of an Islamic State at this particular juncture of history and under the existing 
condition. One of the group’s main arguments can be boiled down to “if not now when, and if 
not us who”. As argued by Abu Jihad al-Shishini, leaving the establishment of sharʿia to 
others after the successful liberation of new land has not borne fruit, seen in the examples of 
Chechnya, Bosnia, Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Rather “the infidels sent hypocrites onto the 
liberated lands and they set up their laws through them”. Al-Shishani vows that this will not 
happen again, and that ISIS rapid implementation of shʿaria in territories under their control is 
to prevent this.
 287
  
6.6 What are the conditions and prerequisites for the 
establishment of an Islamic State? 
Whilst the three have clearly endorsed the establishment of an Islamic State, JN and AS have 
not acknowledged the claimed establishment of the Islamic State (of Iraq and al-Sham) – and 
even less its self-claimed caliphate. Paradoxically their criticism of these establishments have 
been centered in technicalities (such as timing, the necessary preparation such as daʿwa), 
whilst their own envisioned future states are lacking in just that – technicalities – whilst lulled 
in an almost utopian haze. Rather, all three offer plenty of superlatives to describe the virtues 
and qualities of this envisioned state, but have so far been stingy on concrete details regarding 
its power structures, governmental bodies and leadership. Their engagement in rebel 
governance further adds pieces to the puzzle constituting indices of how they could eventually 
choose to set up and organize the management of their envisioned Islamic state. Yet, the 
conditions of rebel governance in a state of war, just as the transparency and accountability of 
their actions, appear highly restricted.  
The clearest overarching difference between the three however is the Islamic State of 
Iraq and al-Sham’s self-professed claim to already being this very Islamic State, and the other 
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two’s rejection of the legitimacy of this claim. As such it could be argued that the main 
divisive issues, at least for now, are those related to the timing and prerequisite conditions 
needed for the establishment of an Islamic states, its geographical borders, the role the groups 
envision for themselves in the establishment and management of the state, and finally the 
groups’ willingness (or unwillingness) to collaborate and potentially compromise in its 
establishment, organization and management.  
Much like legitimacy and value is bestowed upon their envisioned Islamic state by 
counterpoising it with, in their view, dysfunctional or even perverted political principles and 
ruling structured, the self-perception of the group gains significance through the framing of 
their enemies. Or put differently, how they define their enemy, gives us insight as to how they 
perceive themselves and their role in the conflict, to be treated in the following.  
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7 Enemy perception 
It has become clear that the conflict is between right and falsehood, between the treacherous international 
community that wants to give roses to Ahli Sunnah while it hits them with knives in their backs, and a ferocious 
Safavid fighting at all costs to kill the children of the Sunnah before their men and between Jews lurking at Ahli 
Sunnah who are exploiting the general situation and expanding their settlements and extending their siege.
288
 
 
     Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani of Jabhat al-Nusra, December 2013 
This which is called the crescent is nothing but a sickle stabbed in the side of this umma. The purpose of the 
Persian Shiʿite Safavid sickle, my brother, is to be an obstacle to the revival of the umma and the restoration of 
its glory. (…) Now the party of the Iranians in Lebanon is the spearhead of the regime in many of the locations 
abandoned by its soldiers. Israel is the tyrannical enemy of the umma, the usurper of its land and this is 
indisputable to anyone with the slightest awareness of the deprived rights of this umma in their heart.
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Hassan ʿAbbud, June 2013 
 
 [T]he Islamic State in Iraq and Al-Sham is facing the most malicious of wars, as it has three opponents; the 
infidels (kuffār) with all their mouthpieces and medias, the apostates (murtaddun) from among ourselves with all 
their visions and evil scholars, and the people with their heretic tendencies and their Gods of innovation and 
followers of deviated methodologies (al-manahij al-munḥarifa) from among the Muslims, some of them even 
considered mujahidin. And the third category is most painful to us.
290
 
        
Abu Muhammad al-ʿAdnani of ISIS, July 2013 
 
As indicated by the quotes above, the three groups share a complex and multi-layered 
perception of the collective of their perceived enemies. Whether the regime, its allies or other 
fighting parties – the enmity is often based upon what the “other” does as well as what it is 
perceived to be.
 
Further, the role the regime and that of its actual (and perceived) allies is 
commonly intertwined to the point of no distinction. Actions on the ground are linked to “the 
West” and “the Jews” who stand accused of either working actively to promote the regime’s 
further survival and/or securing its interests in the building of a future post-Assad Syria. And, 
finally, their enemies are often embedded in larger narratives of an ongoing regional struggle 
and/or a sectarian eternal battle of historic precedence.  
Finding a structure for addressing and analysing the three groups own multi-layered, 
hydra-headed constituent “other” - the collective, intertwined net of their perceived enemies – 
thus comes with certain challenges. Separating the layers to distinguishing the actors from 
each other, differentiating national from regional, “the near” from “the far”, political from 
religious, actions from perceived inherent evilness for the sake of an orderly analysis, 
ultimately becomes imprecise. Instead I have approached the topic by identifying and 
analysing several overlapping narratives of the conflict in the discourse of the three where the 
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part of “enemy” is filled by states, groups and/or foreign parties. I will both review the 
frequency of these narratives in the groups’ publications and whether or not their proclaimed 
enemies are considered legitimate targets for their operations. The combination of these 
approaches arguable indicate the extent of their enmity towards certain groups, parties, 
countries and systems, and the place which they inhabit in the groups’ hierarchy of real or 
perceived enemies. 
7.1 The Syrian, ʿAlawite, Shiʿite enemy 
The three groups have framed their own engagement in Syria as a defense of the innocent, the 
oppressed ahl al-Sunna (Sunni Muslims) against the oppression and tyranny of the Syrian 
regime and its national and regional supporters. 
291
  There are some noticeable differences as 
to how they conceptualize these enemies.  
Commencing with JN and AS they have largely referred to the Syrian regime as al-
niẓām (the regime) whilst deploying a broad repertoire of derogatory term to denote what they 
consider to be its oppressive as well as its sectarian, Shiʿite, ʿAlawite character, amongst them 
ṭāʾifiyy (sectarian),292 ṭāghiyy (tyrannical)293/294 ẓālim (oppressive),295 kāfir (infidel),296 297 al-
rāfiḍ (“rejectionist”, a derogatory term to denote Shiʿite Muslims) and al-nuṣayriyy 
(ʿAlawite).298 They have further expressed their enmity towards the army and the pro-regime 
militias referred to as shabīḥa.  
The leader and spokesman of ISIS has in comparison left references to the regime or 
the army unmentioned
299
 whilst consistently referring to enemy currently ruling Syria as al-
nuṣayriyya (ʿAlawites). Much like the group has declared war on al-rawāfiḍ (the 
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rejectionists), a derogatory term seemingly applicable to denote both the Iraqi leadership and 
Shiʿite Muslims, the group does not distinguish between the Syrian leadership or civilians of 
ʿAlawite faith in their declared war on al al-nuṣayriyya. 
Embedded in the narrative of a sectarian regime is its links with its regional allies. As 
such all the three groups have since their announcement (and in the case of ISIS prior to its 
entrance into Syria)
 300
 upheld a narrative of an Iranian Shiʿite regional plot encompassing 
Syria. As such the Syrian regime, or al-nuṣayriyya, is but one head of a hydra, Iran, Hizballah 
and Iraqi Shiʿite militas constituting the others. Iran is referred to by the three either as Iran, 
the Persians or the Safavid.
 301
 As for Hizballah (the Party of God) it is rarely referred to as 
such, but rather as ḥizb ʾĪrān (the Party of Iran), ḥizb al-shaytān (the Party of Satan) or ḥizb 
al-lāt.302 
Overlapping with the abovementioned narrative of an ongoing Sunni-Shiʿite war 
where the latter is seen as the expansionist oppressor, is a narrative of an eternal, de-
territorialized, de-contextualized Sunni-Shiʿite conflict where the Syrian conflict is but the 
latest chapter. This is narrative predominantly salient in the discourse of JN and ISIS, whilst 
not seen to a similar extent in the official publications of AS. For instance has al-Jawlani 
accused Shiʿite Muslims of seeking to “annihilate Sunnism (…) under the pretext of wanting 
to revenge the son and daughter of the Prophet.”303 The lack of historic and geographic 
specificity gives it a de-territorialized, de-contextualized eternal character. A similar framing 
of ʿAlawites as an eternal enemy of Sunni Muslims is also found in the discourse of JN, in the 
words of an unidentified preacher of the group;  
“Before Salahuddin conquered bayt al-maqdis (Jerusalem) he fought al-nuṣayriyya. And after Shaykh al-Islam 
Ibn Taymiyyah fought the Tartars, he fought al-nuṣayriyya. They are the spear in the side of the Islamic umma 
(…) I see the conquest of bayt al-maqdis (Jerusalem) after the victory over al-nuṣayriyya.” 304 
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The rationale given for the fight against ʿAlawites is that their “unbelief” described as 
“greater than both the Jews and Christians,” their perceived immoral, un-Islamic practices305 
as well as constituting a test or obstacle sent by God for the people to return to the truthful 
religion.
 306
 
To sum up, the regime and its allies are conceptualized in different ways, however its 
sectarian oppressive character is highlighted by all three groups. As for their enmity towards 
the regime (or alternatively al-nuṣayriyya) the three have framed their opposition against it 
based on its repression and brutality against the population - largely and consistently 
described as sectarian motivated. Whilst explicit accusations of sectarian killings are 
pronounced,
 307
 it is commonly implied by the consistent use derogatory terms to denote the 
regimes perceived sectarian character as Shiʿite,ʿAlavite and/or nuṣayriyy in the critique of its 
brutality. Their incentives for opposing the regime are thus presented as both humanitarian 
and religious emphasizing the severity of the oppression of the Syrian regime and its 
perceived sectarian character. ISIS and JN has further tapped into a narrative of an historic, 
eternal fight between Sunni and Shiʿite Muslim – less on what they do now, but rather what 
they inherently are.  
7.1.1 The extent to which sectarian killings are considered permissible 
Whilst the three groups have adopted a sectarian narrative of the conflict as pitted between 
Sunni Muslims and a Shiʿite axis, and further accused the regime for sectarian motivated 
killings, they differ in so forth as to whether or not Shiʿite and ʿAlawite Muslims constitute 
legitimate targets per se. Whereas all three groups are accused of sectarian motivated killings 
of Shiʿites andʿAlawites,308 as well destroying Shiʿite or Sufi religious sites309 only ISIS have 
included such acts in their publications.
310
 JN and AS on the other have gone to some lengths 
to distance themselves from such accusations.
311
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AS has explicitly denied the targeting of the regime and regime-loyalist on a sectarian 
basis on a number of occasions; 
 (…) we do not engage in battles or fights with the transgressors on the basis of their belief or disbelief, but on 
the basis of their part in the hostilities taking place. Thus the shabīḥa, the soldiers and members of the secret 
service are legitimate targets regardless of their sectarian adherence or descent.
 312
   
 
 JN, for their part, did publish a sermon by an unidentified imam early 2012 where the 
brutality of the regime, and the violent killing of civilians in the Syrian conflict was directly 
linked with the faith (or lack thereof) of the ʿAlawites - continuously referred to al-nuṣayriyy 
(coll. al-nuṣayriyya). Armed jihad against the enemy of al-nuṣayriyya was portrayed as both 
the only way the violence, brutality and indirectly also the sheer presence of ʿAlawites would 
come to an end, and subsequently make way for the building of a righteous society.
 313
 Whilst 
ʿAlawites has continues to be associated with the regime and their faith characterized as un-
Islamic and heretic in the group’s discourse, the group has since only exceptionally endorsed 
retaliatory attacks against civilians based on their religious affiliation and thus perceived 
support of the regime.
314
 Rather, perhaps taking lesson from the experiences of ISIS in Iraq 
where its reputation for brutality caused its rejection by other Sunni insurgency groups, JN 
has made efforts to downplay the civilian casualties caused by its actions - ʿAlawites or not.315  
                                                                                                                                                        
Furqan li-l-ʾIntaj al-ʾIʿlam, 16 November 2013, 08:05, http://jihadology.net/2013/11/20/al-iti%E1%B9%A3am-
media-presents-a-new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-a-window-upon-the-land-of-
epic-battles-27/.  
311
 In the particular case of the accusations by Human Rights Watch in regards to sectarian killings in Latakia, 
AS responded with a statement discarding these accusations. “Bayan al-Maktab al-Siyasiyy: Hawla al-Ittihamat 
‘Human Rights Watch’ wa Maʿrakat al-Sahil” (Satement from the Political Office: Regarding the Accusations of 
‘Human Rights Watch’ and the Battle of the Coast), ahraralsham.com (Official website AS), 14 October 2013, 
http://ahraralsham.net/?p=3165.  
312
 “Man Nahnu?” 
313
 “Al-ʾIsdar al-Marʾiyy: al-Daʿwa li-l-Jihad” (Visual Publication: Call to Jihad). 
314
 I have since only once registered a case where a retaliatory attack against ʿAlawites was deemed legitimate 
targets in the group’s official publications following the chemical attacks in Eastern Ghouta. Abu Muhammad al-
Jawlani, “al-ʿAyn bi-l-ʿAyn” (An Eye for an Eye), Muʾassasat al-Manara al-Baydaʾ li-ʾIntaj al-ʿIlam, 24 
August 2013, 03:31, http://jihadology.net/2013/08/25/al-manarah-al-bay%E1%B8%8Da-foundation-for-media-
production-presents-a-new-audio-message-from-jabhat-al-nu%E1%B9%A3rahs-abu-mu%E1%B8%A5ammad-
al-jawlani-an-eye-for-an-eye/  
315
 The group has published film clips allegedly showing the abortion of military operations so as not to put 
civilians in danger; “Sidq al-Waʿd 1”. The group has on a different occasion claimed that the group has aborted 
military operations to avoid civilian killings on many occasions. “Bayan Raqm 9: Tafjir al-ʾAmn al-ʿAskariyy 
wa-l-Mukhabarat al-Jawiyya fi Dayr al-Zur” (Statement nr. 9: The Blowing up the Military Security and the Air 
Force Intelligence in Dayr al-Zur), Muʾassasat al-Manara al-Baydaʾ li-ʾIntaj al-ʿIlam, 20 May 2012, 
http://jihadology.net/2012/05/20/new-statement-from-jabhat-al-nu%E1%B9%A3rah-bombing-of-the-
headquarters-of-the-military-security-and-air-force-intelligence-in-dayr-az-zur-deir-al-zour/.  
For more on the incident and the possibility of the regime blaming insurgency groups for the attack, see Aaron 
Y. Zelin and Andrew J. Tabler, “Syrian Jihadis: Real and Exaggerated”, Policy Watch 1937, Washinton Insitute 
for Near East Policy, 17 May 2012, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/syrian-jihadis-real-
and-exaggerated    
 72 
 
In the word of its leader, the group operates with three categories of enemies; the security 
branches, the army division and finally some of the ruling figures.
316
 Similarly, most of its 
communiques have listed attacks on military compounds, road blocks, security installations 
and airbases, with occasionally description of attacks on non-military targets with links to the 
regime, such as the Iranian Cultural Council in Damascus and pro-regime press agencies.   
ISIS on the other hand have explicitly (and repeatedly) endorsed the killing of Shiʿite 
and ʿAlawite Muslims seemingly without regards to whether or not they have any direct 
affiliation or supporting role to the Syrian (and/or Iraqi) regime; “All of those who follow the 
[Shi'ite] creed are disbelievers and their blood and money are permissible, and killing them is 
a way to get closer to God.”317 The group’s enmity towards Shiʿite Muslims and ʿAlawites is 
further emphasized in the collective reference to both the leadership and their perceived 
supporters amongst civilians and armed cadres collectively as al-nuṣayriyya (ʿAlawites) 
seemingly makes them all accountable for the oppression of the people ISIS vow to defend 
(Sunni Muslims).  
7.2 “The Far Enemy” of the West 
As for the three groups’ stands on the West, the United States and the International 
community, or “the far enemy”, they share an inherent scepticism towards their intentions in 
Syria as well as in the region. However the three differ in regards to the extent of which this 
scepticism is augmented into enmity, threats and the endorsement of attacks.  
Commencing with AS a review of its publications reveals few if any positive attributed the 
West, Europe and US and the international community, whilst overt threats or narratives of 
historic destructive involvement are equally void. 
Rather, in so forth as the West has been addressed it has been to discourage its 
involvement in the conflict by claiming their fears for an alternative to the regime, commonly 
envisioned as an Islamic governance system, are unsubstantiated. Hassan ʿAbbud have even 
explicitly said that “the Syrian revolution” and its “goals” (as understood by AS), contains 
nothing that “should give rise to fear in the West.”318 However should the West, or any other 
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“invading force”, involve themselves militarily in the conflict “whether to support the regime 
or to allegedly stop aggression it will be treated as an occupying force.” 319  
In comparison the West, and the US in particular, are clearly embedded in JN’s repertoire of 
perceived enemies – in the current conflict as well historically; 
There is a struggle of influence in the region, and that struggle is divided between the Muslims and 
Jews, between the crusader forces and international powers (…) and the Safavid forces represented in what the 
people call the “Shiʿite school” (madhab). These forces have struggled for 3000 years, so this struggle is not 
new, but what changed is that after the emergence of Islam it managed to defeat all those great empires like the 
Persian and the Roman Empire. Islam further expelled the Jews from the Arabian Peninsula. All these powers 
that dominated this land are gathered here, especially here is the cradle of civilizations, here is the cradle of 
religions, and here is the cradle of the conflict.
320
 
 
Rhetoric attacks on the West, the United States, “the international system” and the 
“crusaders” are among the recurrent themes in the speeches of the group’s leader, whilst not a 
“fixed element”.321  As for concrete accusations against the vaguely defined “West”, “the 
international system” and the United States they are repeatedly accused of either 
“collaborating with,” “supporting” or “reviving” 322 the Assad regime - favouring its 
continued rule over the population.
323
 The group has further claimed that “the international 
system” is benefiting from the “Safavid” expansion in the region due to its oil-related interests 
in the region, and as such is abandoning “its former allies in the Gulf replacing them with the 
new Iranian allies”.324 Al-Jawlani has also directed concrete accusation of the West, or the 
alternatively “the international system’s” direct involvement in the crimes of the regime 
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against civilians.
325
 But whilst characterizing the US and “its supporters in the West” as 
“enemies of Islam”,326 threats are largely made on the grounds of self-defence rather than a 
more offensive stand; “And America and the West have to know that any step taken towards 
demolishing the project of Islam in the region politically or militarily will revive the umma 
after its revival two or three times, and they will taste their own medicine”.327 
ISIS have much like JN included the West and the United States - alternatively 
referred to as the “the infidel West” 328 “America and the apostate West”, 329 «the tyrants (al-
ṭawāghīṭ) in the West»330 “the devils of America,”331 and crusaders – amongst their enemies. 
Out of the 13 official speeches made by the two within the timeframe of the analysis, 
crusaders are mentioned in nine
332
 whilst references to “the West” and/or America have 
appeared in ten.
333
  In addition to the accusations embedded in the abovementioned 
characterisations, the West and America is repeatedly accused of conducting a campaign to 
lure Muslims in the region to endorse their “religion of democracy” and call for a “civil 
state.”334 They will allegedly “never accept the establishment of an Islamic state” 335 and 
“hates sharʿia.”336 Based on this, the West is accused of conducting a “relentless media 
campaign” against the group, 337 as well as directly targeting the group with its armies as well 
as through the support of the ṣaḥawāt  in Iraq338 and the groups fighting ISIS in Syria. 339 
As for whether the West and the United States constitute legitimate targets, the following 
quote from al-ʿAdnani not only affirms this but indicates its priority; “We have to always 
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remember the reality of the conflict, and that our war is with the Jews and crusaders, and we 
have to bring them back to direct confrontation with us.”340 Similarly al-Baghdadi himself has 
warned the United States; “beware you protector of the ‘Cross’ that the war by delegation 
won’t help you in al-Sham, as it didn’t in Iraq, and soon you will be in full confrontation (…) 
and that the sons of Islam have prepared themselves for that day.
341
 That said, al-rawāfiḍ (the 
rejectionists) is explicitly described as a more dangerous enemy, against the group, and more 
so, against the Muslim umma.342  
7.3 Regional states 
ISIS has in addition to the regional states of Iran and Iraq in league with the Syrian regime, 
expressed their opposition against other regional states of two categories – both considered to 
be in league with their claimed enemies in the West. Firstly there are the “tyrants of the land 
of Muslims” who support the creation of a democratic civil state in Iraq and al-Sham. 343  
Secondly, ISIS offer staunch critique against Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states for their 
monitory and religious support
344
 to the establishment of a “national state” in Iraq and Syria – 
a state described as “Islamic from the outside” but which “succumbs to the tyrants in the 
West.” 345 This second state-formation is further described as one “that doesn’t frighten 
America, the Jews and the infidel West, and in which al-nuṣayriyya and the religions of 
disbelief are safe and polytheism and its followers are not humiliated.”346 Out of the regional 
states, or more precisely its rulers, critique against the Saudi royal family is particularly 
salient in the discourse of ISIS,
 347
 described as the head of the tyrants.
 348
 
 JN and al-Jawlani has not expressed the same enmity towards other region countries, 
but on one occasion we find al-Jawlani claiming that regional Sunni states are be subjected to 
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the same treat of an Iranian expansion as Syria as Western alliances in the region as shifted 
from the Gulf to Iran. According to al-Jawlani “the international system has turned against 
them [the Sunni regional states] and opened a very wide door for the Safavid regime which 
now threatens all these regimes with demise.”349 Whilst implying a previously more extensive 
collaboration with “the international system” of which JN as shown deep scepticism towards, 
this is not a subject we see further elaborated in the official statements of the group.  
In sum, whilst ISIS considers the regional states ruled by Sunni Muslims to be in 
cahoots with their proclaimed Western enemies, JN for their part considers them to be 
imminent victims of an Iranian regional plot. 
7.4 “A Jewish Plot” 
As for Syria’s neighbouring country to the south, Israel is never mentioned by name, whilst 
all three groups have implied the existence of a “Jewish”, “Zionist” plot in the region, 
however to varying extents and frequency. Interestingly the three has further embedded the 
“Jews” in different categories of enemies. 
AS has for their part suggested collaboration between “the Jews” and “the Shiite 
Muslims” in the region.350 However, whilst this accusation figured in the group’s first 
publication it has not become a recurrent theme in their publications.  
Similar to AS, JN has portrayed Hizballah and the Syrian regime as convenient allies 
of “the Jews” and Israel, the former for its attacks on Sunni Muslims, and the latter for 
“guarding the borders for more than 40 years”.351 “The Jews” are further accused of 
exploiting the “Safavid killing of the children of al-Sunna (Sunna Muslims) (...) to expand 
their settlements and extend their siege” of the Palestinian territories.352 In addition to claims 
that “the Jews” are exploiting the current conflict to their own benefit, they are further 
presented as an “historic enemy” of Muslims in the region alongside “crusader forces and 
international powers” and “the Safavid forces”;353  
There is a struggle of influence in the region, and that struggle is divided between the Muslims and Jews, 
between the crusader forces and international powers (…) and the Safavid forces represented in what the people 
call the “Shiʿite school” (madhab). These forces have struggled for 3000 years, so this struggle is not new, but 
what changed is that after the emergence of Islam it managed to defeat all those great empires like the Persian 
and the Roman Empire. Islam further expelled the Jews from the Arabian Peninsula. All these powers that 
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dominated this land are gathered here, especially here is the cradle of civilizations, here is the cradle of 
religions, and here is the cradle of the conflict.
354
 
 
ISIS has similarly described “the Jews” as enemies of either the group and/or Sunni Muslims 
– today or historically – in ten out of thirteen speeches.355 In these speeches ISIS enmity 
against “the Jews” are seen as both allied with the enemies of the West - “the crusaders”,356 
ʿulamāʾ al-ṣulṭān (clerics of the sultan), “those who call for a civil state,”357 – as well as ”al-
nuṣayriyya.”358 They are further accused of “fight[ing] God and His Messenger”.359 Whilst 
ISIS has not engaged in fights with “the Jews” or Israel directly within the timeframe of this 
analysis, quotes such as the following clearly shows that ISIS not only endorses attacks on 
“the Jews”, but sees it as a priority; “We have to always remember the reality of the conflict, 
and that our war is with the Jews and crusaders, and we have to bring them back to direct 
confrontation with us.
360
  
7.5 Religious scholars 
Embedded in ISIS’ critique of regional states are the religious scholars considered by ISIS to 
be co-opted by these regimes. Such scholars are rarely mentioned by name,
361
 but rather 
referred to alternately as ʿulamāʾ al-ṣulṭān (clerics of the sultan),362 ʿulamāʾ ʾĀl-salul (the 
clerics of Saudi Arabia
363
)
364
 and ʿulamāʾ al-sūʾ (evil scholars).365 The critique of these 
scholars has figured in six out of ten speeches by the group’s spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-
ʿAdnani. 366 ISIS enmity towards these scholars based on their acceptance and support of what 
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ISIS considers to by tyrant regimes and un-Islamic governance systems,
 367
 for spreading false 
allegations regarding ISIS, encouraging coexistence with “al-rāfiḍa” 368 and discouraging 
armed jihad.
369 
 
 Whilst the narrative of religious scholars obstructing the call to armed jihad, is 
identifiable in some film clips of the group
370
 it is not frequent nor voiced by its leader nor the 
scholars which have been profiled in its official publications. Rather we find a member of 
JN’s sharʿia council, Abu ʿAbdullah al-Shami, claiming “the scholars of the Islamic umma” 
had stopped “urging people to stay away from jihad and mujahidin” now calling for their 
support and “for God to grant them victory.”371 Coinciding with the intensification of the 
rebel infighting against ISIS, al-Shami emphasizied the collaboration between JN and these 
“scholars of the Islamic umma” indicating a broad religious legitimation for the position of JN 
juxtaposed a scholarly isolation of ISIS. 
7.6 What constitute the groups’ hierarchy of enemies and 
target selection? 
Whilst the three groups have expressed enmity towards largely the same parties, flanks and 
states, largely “the usual suspects” in Salafi-Jihadi discourse, their hierarchy of enemies 
arguably differ. The near enemy, as conceptualized as the Syrian regime and its supporters, is 
for obvious reasons a higher priority in the groups’ operational activities as well as the most 
recurrent object of vocal attacks in their publications. As for the “far enemy” JN and ISIS 
have to a greater extent than AS expressed enmity against “the West” and “the international 
society” for their perceived direct involvement in the conflict. 
The three further differ in so forth as their pronounced enemies overlap (or not) with 
whom they consider to be legitimate targets for their operations. This is clearest when it 
comes to their sectarian framing of the conflict, where one can arguable distinguish between 
sectarianism (AS and JN) and violent sectarianism (ISIS). As such ISIS stands out from the 
rest regarding the degree of brutality they choose to expose in their online self-projection of 
themselves and promotion of their actions. Whereas other groups have been known to kill 
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alleged criminals without a trial or assassinated pro-regime militia members or Alawites, as 
far as I’m have registered, none have chosen to record and spread video-clips of this online to 
the extent that ISIS has. 
It can further be argued that the groups’ perception of enemy compliments their self-
perception. Much like legitimacy and value is bestowed upon their envisioned Islamic state by 
counterpoising it with, in their view, dysfunctional or even perverted political principles and 
ruling structured, the self-perception of the group gains significance through the framing of 
their enemies. Or put differently, how they define their enemy, gives us insight as to how they 
perceive themselves and their role in the conflict. Whilst AS, and to a lesser extent JN, have 
limited their battle, their enemies and proclaimed targets to the ones they confront in Syria, 
ISIS fronts a perception of a de-territorialized conflict and de-territorialized enemy further 
enforcing their self-perception as an eternal force.  
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8 The geographical scope of their 
operations and aims 
We have said from the start that we aspire to return the governance of God to His land then revive the umma to 
implement his sharʿia and spread his methodology.372 
Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani of Jabhat al-Nusra, April 2013 
 
[W]e announced that we wish to establish an Islamic state in Syria, and this state will replace the current 
regime. As for our aspirations we yearn for the day when these states come together and unite as is the case with 
the [states in the] European Union which removed the borders between themselves.
 373
 
       
Hassan ʿAbbud of Ahrar al-Sham, June 2013 
 
We will not forget to renew the pledge to the Umma that we won’t enjoy life until we liberate the Muslims 
everywhere, and until were regain Al-Quds, return Al-Andalus, and conquer Rome, God willing.
 374 
       
Abu Muhammad al-ʿAdnani of ISIS, July 2013 
 
The aim of (re-)creating a unity of the Muslim nation (umma) transcending geographical 
borders, racial divides, and state-citizenship is considered a key trait of Salafism. As 
illustrated by the quotes above, it is also an aim shared by JN, AS and ISIS. The spectrum of 
other groups, movements and ideologues – from Jamal al-Din al-Afghani to al-Qaʿida, who 
have endorsed the same “mission” – further illustrates that the aim in itself does not dictate 
the measures, nor the short-term geographical scope of one’s agenda. Rather, the 
manifestation of this aim into plans and actions, and in particular the geographical limitations 
of these plans may vary greatly. In short, some have confined their struggle to the national 
state and explicitly “postponed” any larger regional or global “revolution” to the far-future. 
Others have argued that the establishment of a regional caliphate is imminent and thus 
operates with a geographical scope transcending existing borders – rhetorically as well as 
operationally. Others again might harbor regional or global ambitions, but are (for the time 
being) more locally focused due to economic and/or operational hindrances. Finally, there are 
numerous instances of groups shifting their geographical priorities over the course of their 
lifespan, al-Qaʿida itself arguably constituting a well know example. This notwithstanding, a 
group’s geographic priorities and ambitions, and whether or not its “national”, “regional” or 
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“global” (or alternatively “state-oriented”, “nation-oriented”, “umma-oriented”375 or 
“transnational salafiyya”376) constitute a common key distinguisher in comparative analyses 
of salafi/salafi-jihadi movements.  
In the following I will move beyond the idealized vision of a united, transnational 
umma, state or caliphate shared by the three, and look into the way they have explicitly 
expressed their geographical ambitions and self-imposed territorial limitations.  
I will first review in brief where the groups did in fact operate during the timespan of this 
study (January 2012 and May 2014). Secondly, I will approach the overarching question of 
whether they are primarily nationally, regionally or globally by posing three sub questions; 
1) To what extent have the group identified themselves as Syrian? 
2) To what extent have they expressed regional aims? 
3)   To what extent have they expressed global aims? 
8.1 The geographical locus of their operational activities 
Aside from discourse, the most apparent indicator of a group’s regional or global ambitions is 
perhaps whether or not they are in fact active and has a public presence in other countries.
377
 
In this sense ISIS and JN stand out as the most regional, as both have established a presence 
and launched attacks in several countries.  
Commencing with the former, and its predecessors, they were primarily operating in 
Iraq prior to entering Syria in April 2013 under the name of ISIS. The group did also claim 
responsibility for an attack in Jordan in November 2005 as well as being instrumental in 
establishing JN summer/fall 2011. Since April 2013 the group has publically conducted 
operations concurrently in both Syria and Iraq - and from late 2013 adding Lebanon to the 
list.
378
  
As for JN and its nascence in Iraq considered, it did not claim responsibility for any 
attacks in the country within the timeframe of the study. Whilst it declared fighting Hizballah 
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in Syria as a top priority July 2013,
379
 it first announced its presence in Lebanon December 
2013
380
 and officially endorsed attacks on the group in Lebanon by 24 January 2014.
381
 
Compared to the abovementioned two, AS did not claim responsibility for any attacks 
outside Syria within the timeframe of the study, nor has it claimed or admitted to having any 
sub-group or factions operating outside Syria. 
8.1.1 Why Lebanon?  
Whilst the group’s actions, recruitment networks and transnational links382 to groups in other 
countries falls outside the scope of this study, it is relevant to see how JN and ISIS have 
framed their activities in Lebanon largely as part of the Syrian conflict and a defence against 
what they perceive to be an Iranian, Shiite project in the region.  
JN (in Lebanon) did not express any explicit aim to establish territorial control in 
Lebanon, but framed their attacks as retaliation against Hizballah, referred to interchangeably 
as either the party of Iran (ḥizb ʾIrān) or the party of satan (ḥizb al-shayṭān), for their 
“continuous killings and arrests of the ahl al-Sunna (Sunnite Muslims) in Lebanon,”383 
“crimes against the women and children of ahl al-Sunna in Syria,”384 “their tyranny and 
criminal acts” in both countries385, and “the coward act” of “placing their bases amongst 
civilians.”386 These allegedly sectarian motivated killings and oppression was further framed 
as part of Iran’s “project” in the region – namely spreading “wilāyat al-faqīh” (the 
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guardianship of the Islamic jurist).
387
 Additionally, JN (in Lebanon) offered implicit warnings 
for the Lebanese army which they accused of facilitating the crossing of Hizballah fighters 
into Syria as well as guarding their positions in Lebanon in the meanwhile.
388
  
In sum, JN (in Lebanon) framed their operations against Hizballah as an extension of their 
fight in Syria – namely as revenge for what they consider to be sectarian killings against 
Sunni Muslims. However, whilst the end-goal for their operation in Syria has been 
conceptualized as the fall of the Syrian regime and the establishment of an Islamic state in its 
place, there are no pronounced larger aim for Lebanon other than to forcing Hizballah out of 
Syria, end their alleged arrests, oppression and killing of Sunni Muslims – and consequently 
sabotage Iran’s involvement in the region. Whilst Lebanon’s Sunni Muslims are encouraged 
to “form ranks against Hizballah",389 JN (in Lebanon) did not issue an official nafir (call to 
jihad) specific for Lebanon as it did with Syria or al-Sham, nor did it issue any territorial 
claims, aims of implementing sharʿia or establish an Islamic state in the country.  
Even prior to ISIS official establishment in Syria, ISI’s spokesman Abu Muhammad 
al-ʿAdnani lashed out against Hizballah (as well as Iraqi Shi’ite militias) for sending their 
“snipers and criminals to Syria to shed the blood of defenseless people.”390 By June 2013, al-
ʿAdnani swore on behalf of the group that they would remove the current borders and attack 
“al-rawāfiḍ”, “al-nuṣayriyya and ḥizb al-lāt” “from Diayala to Beirut”391 – showing their 
ambitions for entering Lebanon. A part from joining Sunni Muslims in a borderless entity, 
their motivation for entering Lebanon is their opposition against “al-rawāfiḍ” and their rule 
and ravaging against Sunni Muslims there, just as in Iraq and Syria; 
Al-rawāfiḍ (the rejectionists) have cooperated and collaborated, made a pledge to fight you everywhere and you 
have seen their real face in al-Sham, and it began to reveal in Iraq, and soon you will see the Safavid warplanes 
and tanks shelling your neighbourhoods, and storming your homes. You will see the rāfiḍiyy (rejectionist) 
militias plundering your money, and killing your sons, and raping your women, in the streets of Sidon, Beirut, 
Diyala and Baghdad.
392
 
In sum, the two groups have presented their operations in Lebanon firstly as an extension of 
the Syria/Iraq offensive against the multi-headed enemy of Iran, the Assad regime and 
Hizballah (and in the case of ISIS also including the Iraqi leadership and Shiʿite militias). 
                                                 
387
 “Bayan 9: Risala ʾila ʿUqalaʾ Lubnan”. 
Wilāyat al-faqīh here refers to the politico-religious doctrine for the Islamic governance developed by Ruhollah 
Khomeini and implemented in Iran after the revolution in 1979. 
388
 Ibid. 
389
 “Bayan 2: ʿAmaliyya Istishhadiyya ʿala Maʿqal Hizb Iran fi al-Harmal”. 
390
 Abu Muhammad al-ʿAdnani, “al-ʿIraq al-ʿIraq ya ʾAhl al-Sunna” (Iraq, Iraq – O Sunni Muslims), Muʾassasat 
al-Furqan li-l-ʾIntaj al-ʾIʿlam, 24 February 2012, 33:38, http://jihadology.net/2012/02/24/al-furqan-media-
presents-a-new-audio-message-from-the-islamic-state-of-iraqs-shaykh-abu-mu%E1%B8%A5ammad-al-adnani-
iraq-iraq-oh-ahl-al-sunnah/ 
391
 Al-ʿAdnani, “Fa-dhurrhum wa ma yaftarun”.  
392
 Al-ʿAdnani, “al-Raʾid la yakdhibu ʾAhlahu”.  
 84 
 
Secondly, their operations in Lebanon are portrayed as defensive in order to protect Sunni 
Muslims in the country. Finally whilst both groups speak of (Sunni) Muslims unity 
transcending the borders, and endorse the ideal of a Sunni Muslim territorial unity, ISIS is the 
most explicit of the two in their ambitions of making it happen.   
8.2 To what extent have the groups identified themselves 
as Syrian? 
8.2.1 Syria as self-identification  
The three commonly alternate between ʾahl al-Shām (the people of the Levant or greater 
Syria), ʾahl al-Sunna (lit. the people of tradition, Sunni Muslims), al-ʾumma (the Muslims 
community or nation) when addressing their adherence, as well as who they claim to 
represent, support and defence. The three concepts contain a transnational dimension 
indicating an adherence to and/or self-identification with a community transcending the 
borders of the Syrian state. Simultaneously, all three have incorporated al-Sham into their 
respective names indicative of the (immediate) priority of this geographical area; however 
whereas AS are “the Freemen of al-Sham”, JN and ISIS respectively claim to be the 
protectors of al-Sham and the larger state overarching al-Sham sidelining it with Iraq.
393
 This 
nuance in their chosen name is arguably identifiable in the way they frame their role in the 
conflict in so forth as the former to a larger extent than the latter two has added the attribute of 
“Syrian” to their characteristics and self-definition.  
Commencing with JN, a review of the official speeches and statements by the group’s 
leader and leadership we find multiple references to al-Sham as “our land” 394 “the people of 
al-Sham” as “our people”.395 In comparison, the same source material is void of expressions 
such as “us” or “we” when speaking of and to Syrians or the people of al-Sham. A review of 
the speeches of al-Baghdadi and al-ʿAdnani reveals the same result, the group frequently 
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speak of or to “our people of al-Sham” 396 whilst a self-definition as Syrian or shāmiyy (from 
al-Sham) is not to be found. Whilst both frame their work as for “the people of al-Sham” 
whom they praise, and willing show and address Syrians admits their ranks - Syrians as a 
whole are continuously addressed as in second person or spoken of in third person and not 
included in a first-person self-definition as such.  
AS has on the other hand has to a greater extent than the other two added the attribute 
of “Syrian” to their characteristics and ultimately their self-definition, whether in quotes by 
Hassan ʿAbbud saying; “we, as Syrian people”397 or in the chosen name of the group and its 
alliances (Syrian Islamic Front and Syria’s Revolutionaries Front). The group has further 
framed their establishment and engagement in the conflict as an extension of the popular 
uprising which commenced in March 2011 framing the group as predominantly a Syrian 
movement. 
8.2.2 Foreign fighters  
The three groups are known recipients of foreign fighters, and have according to some 
contributed to the funneling, relocation and training of some of them.
398
 With the entrance of 
ISIS into the conflict, anecdotal evidence has indicated the tendency of foreign fighters have 
left other groups such as AS and JN to join forces with ISIS, whilst far from sufficient to 
estimate numbers.
399
 Whilst the question of the number of foreign fighters in their ranks 
remains unanswered by the groups themselves,
400
 the saliency of foreign fighters in the self-
projected public image of the various groups is however measurable. In this regard ISIS 
clearly stands out compared to JN and AS.  
All three have publically, at various times, endorsed the presence of non-Syrian 
fighters amongst the ranks of the opposition, praised their efforts and sacrifices, and invited 
                                                 
396
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them to join their own ranks. Further, all three has condemned the targeting of foreign fighters 
per se/regardless of group affiliation following with the uprising against ISIS from January 
2014.
401
 The three groups have consistently referred to foreign fighters as muhājirūn (sgl. 
muhājir) or “emigrants” – a title used to denote the followers of the Prophet which followed 
him from Mekka to Medina. Similarly, Syrians when referred to in the context of foreign 
fighters are commonly referred to as ʾanṣār or “helpers” – a title used to denote the 
inhabitants receiving Muhammad and his followers in Medina.
402
  
However, whilst JN and ISIS have on several occasions “renewed” their seemingly 
open invitation
403
 for foreign fighters to join the fighting in Syria,
404 
AS seemingly altered 
their stands on the need for non-Syrian fighters in May 2014.
405
 Whilst this constituted a clear 
departure of their former stands on foreign fighters, ʿAbbud subsequently clarified that their 
critique was primarily directed against ISIS deceiving “the emigrants” to become a “tool of 
killing the Syrian people” whilst no a “war declaration” against foreign fighters per se.406 AS 
did not however seize to collaborate with foreign fighters following this statement - whether 
in the ranks of other groups such as JN, or in foreign fighter led groups. However, in 
comparison with the other two, AS has largely refrained from glorifying these non-Syrian 
fighters at the length and frequency as ISIS and JN. 
Al-Jawlani has emphasized the presence of non-Syrian fighters as of “the outmost 
importance for the kinship of Islam in this historic struggle.”407   He has further referred to 
them as the “pure and sincere brothers» 408 and praised them for their “sacrifice of money and 
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wealth (…) to come to our land and accompany our people” – an “emigration” which makes 
them stand above the rest, according to Abu ʿAbdullah al-Shami of the groups sharʿia-
council.
409
 Praising sacrifice of the foreign fighters is similarly a common theme in the 
publications of ISIS,
 410
 and their flocking to ISIS (as recruits or from other groups) is 
portrayed as proof of the group’s own sincerity and pureness.411  
8.3 Regional aims 
As seen in the above, JN, AS and ISIS have continuously applied transnational concepts, such 
as Sunni Muslims and the Muslim umma, in their self-definition as well as to denote the 
people the claim to represent and support. As for the explicit aim of removing the borders 
currently dividing Sunni Muslims and the people of al-Sham, the three groups have on 
different occasions rejected the legality and legitimacy of the current borders separating the 
regional powers, commonly conceptualized as a rejection of the Sykes Picot-agreement based 
on which the current borders between Syria, Lebanon and Jordan were drawn. The three differ 
however whether or not they have added eradication of these borders to their pending “check-
list.” 
AS, in the words of Hassan ʿAbbud, have explicitly denied that they are aiming for the  
establishment of a larger caliphate whilst noting their “aspiration” of larger union of similar 
states on a model of the European Union; 
“(…) we announced that we wish to establish an Islamic state in Syria, and this state will replace the current 
regime. As for our aspirations we yearn for the day when these states come together and unite as is the case with 
the [states in the] European Union which removed the borders between themselves.” 412 
 
The group further warned about the potential “dangers of regionalizing the conflict” with the 
establishment of ISIS and JN’s pledge of allegiance to al-Zawahiri.413 The group’s limitation 
to Syria, has been repeated on a number of occasions.
414
 
ISIS for their part made the rejection of what they refer to as “man-made borders” a central 
component in the legitimation of their entrance into Syria; 
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“We have gone past the borders that were drawn by the evil hands between the lands of Islam to restrict our 
movement and make us stay inside them. And we will work, God willing, to remove them. This blessed march will 
not stop until we put the last nail in the coffin of the conspiracy of Sykes-Picot.” 415 
 
Its steadfastness to remaining in Syria, despite al-Zawahiri’s orders of returning to Iraq, was 
sloganized by the phrase bāqiyya (remaining) or bāqiyya fī al-ʿIraq wa-l-Shām (remaining in 
Iraq and al-Sham). The phrase was initially the title of a speech by al-Baghdadi
416
 but it 
quickly turned into the group’s unofficial slogan recurrently appearing in their own official 
publications and frequently voiced by its supporters online.  
The aim of expanding their operations – and attack the enemies of the umma in other 
areas - has further been portrayed as a longstanding aim of the group, in particular after al-
Zawahiri’s rebuke of the group. In the words of al-ʿAdnani, what had stopped them so far 
from launching attacks regionally (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia), had been 
their respect for the “advice and guidance” of AQ leadership – not their agreement nor 
operational or organizational subordination.
417
 With al-Zawahiri’s official disavowal of the 
group in February 2014, this respect has seemingly vaporized and the advices of the AQ 
leadership no longer constitute an obstacle for the group’s propagating its regional 
aspirations; 
So lions in Anbar, Ninava, Salahuddin, Kirkuk, Diyali, Baghdad and the south – continue to expand and redraw 
the maps. For today you complete the hope of the oppressed in all lands. The prisoners await you in Baghdad, 
Rumiyya (Lebanon), in Aleppo, in al-Ha’ir (Saudi Arabia) and in Abu Zaʿabl(Egypt). Verily you have an 
appointement in Baghdad, in Damascus and in Jerusalem (al-Quds) in Mekka and Medina. Verily you have an 
appointmentin Dabiq, in Ghouta and in Rome (God willing).”418 
 
As seen above, their territorial aims further expand the closer regional power to territories 
which historically has been part of the Islamic caliphate, such as Rome and al-Andalus.  
In comparison, JN have neither pronounced an equally dismissive stand towards military 
engagement outside Syria (and Lebanon) as AS, nor as explicit aims of expanding regionally 
and globally as ISIS in their official publications. Rather, the group have consistently presents 
itself as part of a “project of Islam in the region,” “a new era for ahl al-Sunna in the region” or 
the “blessed jihadi movement on the land of al-Sham” 419 whilst not its sole component. And, 
whilst this jihadi movement in al-Sham will, according to al-Jawlani, “restore to Islam its role 
in the region”420 he does not specify if this will involve their own military involvement in 
regional powers, or if an eventual fall of Syria will simply be the first tipping domino-piece. 
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Further, geographically unspecific expressions such as «God’s land» in the following quote is 
another example of the groups vagueness on a potentially larger regional scope for its 
operations; “We have said from the beginning that we aspire to return the governance of God 
on His land then reviving the umma to implement His sharʿia and spread His methodology 
(manhaj).”421 With similar vagueness the group’s leader has expressed the vision of “the 
conquest of al-Quds (Jerusalem)” after victory in Syria, whilst leaving the question of 
whether or not JN will be the conquerors unanswered.
422
 
8.4 Global aims 
Whilst the three share great scepticism for America, the West and the international society 
and to various extent categorize such entities amongst their enemies, only ISIS have 
emphasized its broader geographic ambitions, at least rhetorically. The leadership of ISIS 
have repeatedly expressed the aim of returning the Islamic caliphate “to all of the areas from 
which it withdrew and lost its control; primarily al-Andalus
423
 as well as to conquer the heart 
of the West symbolized by Rome; “we do not forget to renew the pledge to the umma that we 
won’t enjoy life until we liberate the Muslims everywhere, and until were retrieve Al-Quds 
and regain Al-Andalus, and conquer Rome.”424 Retaking these territories has become almost a 
formulaic expression repeated in several speeches by spokesman al-ʿAdnani,425 and leader al-
Baghdadi.
426
 Similar expression has further been repeated by several of their fighters in 
promotional film clips,
427
 and even the group’s Twitter posted «today in al-Raqqa and 
tomorrow in Rome»
428
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In comparison there are no similar expressed aim to (re)take al-Andalus and Rome, 
nor any other historic or existing non-regional geographic entity, in the official discourse of 
AS and JN. Rather, as seen earlier, the two upholds a defensive position in regards to the 
West - vowing to strike if attacked first.  
8.5 How do the groups prioritize between territorial and 
creedal unity vs. explicit geographical aims? 
The three groups share a complex relation to the ideal of territorial and creedal unity, which to 
various extent overlap with their explicit geographical aims. A central part of the groups’ self-
definition is heir self-identification as part of the (transnational) entities of the umma and 
Sunni Muslims. The three further considers the enemies they confront in Syria to be a threat 
to these transnational entities transcending the country’s borders. Out of the three however, 
AS has distinguished themselves from the other two by emphasizing the attribute of Syrian in 
their self-definition and similarly the geographical scope they limit their operations to. Whilst 
the group has included foreign fighters admits its ranks it has seemingly not considered them 
to be essential to the uprising nor its aftermath.  
In contrast JN and ISIS have framed their efforts, their ranks and their perception of 
the conflict as a transnational affaire. However whilst JN has extended its fighting to 
Lebanon, it has largely framed it as an extension of its Syria-operations, rather than the 
accomplishment of a territorial expansion. Whilst the group certainly does not exclude the 
possibility of fighting in other countries, it is seemingly not a priority – at least until the fall of 
Assad.  
ISIS on the other hand has described its expansive regional aims as curbed by its 
(former) respect for the leadership of al-Qaʿida and their commands. With the evaporation of 
this respect the group’s regional ambitions has been unleashed and the multinational cadre of 
its fighters set to expand the borders of their self-professed state regionally and potentially 
stretching into the West.  
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9 Conclusory remarks 
Due to the ongoing nature of the Syrian conflict and the unpredictability of its future 
evolution this study has not offered any clear-cut conclusion, but rather constitutes a snap-
shot of the ideological discourse and debate within one flank of the Syria uprising within the 
time-frame of January 2012 and May 2014. Valuating which ideological difference is more 
substantial or characterizing for each of the three is however a question I have deliberately left 
unanswered as I consider it to be too subjective and largely dependent on the groups’ further 
evolution which arguably is based on opportunity as well as ideology in a highly 
unpredictable conflict.   
As for the status of today (30 May 2015) the Syrian conflict is well into its fifth year 
with the material destruction multiplied, an American-led coalition against ISIS/IS arisen and 
neither any political nor military solution seems any closer. As for the three groups, JN, AS 
and ISIS/IS, they continue to occupy large territories, influence large ideological influence on 
other armed groups and arguably also globally. Some of their discursive nuances have 
evolved into actual differences on the ground, most prominently has ISIS further elevated its 
state building project symbolically and territorially with the announcement of an Islamic 
caliphate and a rapid branching regionally. Whilst the top leadership of AS is largely changed 
after a mysterious explosion wiped out Hassan ʿAbbud and a large number of commanders, its 
operational cooperation with JN has continued as before. Similarly, the two’s ideological 
arguments and sporadic fighting with ISIS has continued – largely regarding relations with 
other groups and the exclusionist self-perception as an Islamic State. Finally, JN and ISIS 
both uphold their claim to be the guardians and inheritors of the legacy of bin Ladin – JN as 
the most successful affiliate of al-Qaʿida, and IS/ISIS as the increasingly successful renegade.  
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